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The Secretary Recommendation Problem
Niklas Hahn∗ Martin Hoefer† Rann Smorodinsky‡
Abstract
In this paper we revisit the basic variant of the classical secretary problem. We propose a new
approach in which we separate between an agent that evaluates the secretary performance and one that
has to make the hiring decision. The evaluating agent (the sender) signals the quality of the candidate
to the hiring agent (the receiver) who must make a decision. Whenever the two agents’ interests are not
fully aligned, this induces an information transmission (signaling) challenge for the sender. We study the
sender’s optimization problem subject to persuasiveness constraints of the receiver for several variants of
the problem.
Our results quantify the loss in performance for the sender due to online arrival. We provide optimal
and near-optimal persuasive mechanisms that recover at least a constant fraction of a natural utility
benchmark for the sender. The separation of evaluation and decision making can have a substantial
impact on the approximation results. While in some scenarios, techniques and results closely mirror
the conditions in the standard secretary problem, we also explore conditions that lead to very different
characteristics.
Keywords: Bayesian Persuasion, Secretary Problem, Online Algorithms, Approximation Algorithms
1 Introduction
In the classical secretary problem a sequence of n candidates with unknown valuations arrives sequentially
in uniform random order. Upon arrival, a decision maker observes the value of a candidate and must make
an irreversible decision of whether to hire the candidate or observe the subsequent one. The lion’s share of
this literature studies optimal or near-optimal algorithms for the decision maker and provides many elegant
results on how well she can perform (see, e.g., [13, 17, 9, 5, 23, 25, 19, 8, 16, 20, 26, 27] and many more).
In this problem, the decision maker is tasked with two responsibilities: (1) evaluate the candidate, and
(2) make the decision of whether or not to hire. In many settings, these two tasks are separated and the
evaluation is done separately from the hiring decision. In this paper, we initiate the study of (near-)optimal
persuasive mechanisms for the secretary problem when the evaluation is done by one agent while the decision
is taken by another. Following tradition in the literature, we shall often refer to the latter as a ‘receiver’
and to the former as a ’sender’. The separation between evaluation and hiring decision introduces incentives
that are immaterial to the original setting.
The aforementioned separation is wide-spread in applications. Consider, for example, the original mo-
tivating story of hiring an employee (e.g., a secretary). It is often the case that firms separate between
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the evaluation process, often led by a specialized HR department, and the hiring individual (the prospective
boss). Another setting that has such a separation is in financial projects and investment opportunities. Many
firms hire third-party consultants to evaluate a sequence of financial opportunities and use the consultant’s
report in their decision process. An opportunity not seized is often an opportunity foregone.
To capture the incentive discrepancies between the sender and receiver, we endow each candidate with
two valuations, one that is associated with the sender and one with the receiver. Candidates arrive according
to a uniform random order. Upon arrival, the valuation pair is disclosed to the sender, who then makes some
recommendation to the receiver. The receiver in turn takes one of two irrevocable actions, to hire or not to
hire. Throughout the paper, we assume the sender has commitment power, and we design mechanisms for
her recommendation such that the receiver always finds it in her interest to adopt the recommended action.
Our goal is to design mechanisms that achieve (near-)optimal expected utility for the sender.
Initially, we study an elementary scenario – primarily for didactic reasons – in which we assume that
the valuation pairs of all candidates are known to both players in advance. Both players a-priori have full
information about (1) the set of valuation pairs, (2) the fact that candidates arrive in uniform random order,
and (3) the mechanism the sender uses for recommendation. In round t, the sender gets to see the arriving
candidate and makes a recommendation using the mechanism. By applying Bayesian updates based on the
a-priori information and the signals received in this and the previous rounds, the receiver can then decide
whether it is in her interest to follow the recommendation or not. We provide optimal persuasive mechanisms
for the sender, and we use this scenario as benchmark for the subsequent analysis. Hence, this is our basic
or benchmark scenario.
Our main interest lies in the secretary scenario as it is more reminiscent of the original secretary problem.
Here the valuation pairs are unknown to the two players and are set by an adversary, but their arrival order
is known to be uniform at random. The unknown adversarial design of valuations raises questions about
modeling the incentives of the receiver. To determine her interests, the receiver should be able to evaluate
what is “in store” for her if she adopts the sender’s recommendation or deviates to another hiring strategy.
To enable this decision, we adopt a robust approach and require that the mechanism is persuasive even if
the receiver knows all valuation pairs (and, thus, has the same a-priori information as in the basic scenario
above). Note that such a mechanism stays persuasive even if the receiver does not know the valuation
pairs, since persuasiveness is merely a guarantee that it is in the receiver’s interest to always follow the
recommendation. Therefore, on a technical level, the secretary scenario differs from the basic scenario by the
sender a-priori lacking information about valuation pairs. In the secretary scenario, we provide a persuasive
mechanism that guarantees a constant-factor approximation in the expected utility for the sender when
compared to the optimum from the basic scenario. Hence, for a sender in a signaling context, secretary-style
online arrival only results in a performance deterioration by a small constant factor.
Moreover, we study both scenarios in two different variants: In the first one, the receiver only receives the
sender’s signals; in the second one, she is also informed about the valuations of rejected candidates. We refer
to this variant as a scenario with disclosure. For motivation, one can think of candidates that are foregone
as candidates that go on the market which, inter-alia, extracts and makes public all the relevant information
about the candidate. In the example with financial investments, one can think of a sequence of investment
opportunities given to some prominent investor (e.g., a top-ten private equity fund) before they go on the
market. In the basic scenario with disclosure, we again obtain a mechanism with a constant approximation
ratio. However, disclosure in the secretary scenario can lead to a deterioration in the expected utility by a
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factor of Θ(1/n).
We examine all four scenarios (basic and secretary, both with and without disclosure) with different
utilities that are standard in the literature on the secretary problem. With cardinal utility a player strives
to maximize her expected valuation of the hired candidate. In contrast, with ordinal utility she strives
to maximize the probability that her best candidate is hired. Our goal in all variants is to design good
persuasive mechanisms for the sender. In almost all variants, we show constant approximation ratios, thus,
even with online arrival and/or disclosure the expected utility for the sender deteriorates only by a small
constant factor. Also, we show that many ratios are optimal or asymptotically optimal with respect to any
persuasive mechanism.
1.1 Related Literature
Our work can be seen as an extension of the celebrated secretary problem which first appeared in print in
Martin Gardner’s 1960 Scientific American column [18] (but apparently originated much earlier, see [17]).
The problem gained considerable popularity, and subsequently various extensions have been studied (c.f. [17]
for an early survey and [9] for recent extensions). In all the literature we are familiar with, a separation
between candidate evaluation and hiring decision is non-existent.
In our model the sender has commitment power and hence our work contributes to the burgeoning
literature on Bayesian persuasion, which originated in Aumann and Maschler [4] and more recently enjoyed
a renaissance through the work of Gentzkow and Kamenica [22]. In particular, one can think of our model
as an online Bayesian persuasion model, where the state of nature is revealed in a round-wise fashion to
the sender who in turn sends a signal to the receiver in each round. Whereas dynamic Bayesian persuasion
problems have been studied by various authors (e.g., [14, 15, 3]), we are not familiar with an analysis of
an online variant similar to what we study. Ely [14] studies the case that the sender observes the current
state and sends a message to the receiver. Using this information, the receiver’s beliefs are updated, and she
takes an action according to her current belief. The state of nature evolves according to a stochastic process,
namely Poisson transitions over states. In principle, our approach might also be cast within a framework of
a single, evolving state of nature, but the specific details of this approach would turn out to be very different
from [14]. Au [3] studies an approach, where in each round the receiver either takes an action or goes on to
the next round. Unlike our model, the action is the same throughout. Once the action is taken, the process
ends and both parties get their respective utilities. The sender extracts positive utility from the fact that the
receiver has taken the action, regardless of the state of nature. Hence, the sender’s objective is persuading
the receiver to take the action. The receiver’s utility depends on the state. A somewhat different approach
is taken by Ely et al. [15] where the authors study the notions of suspense and surprise, i.e. the variance in
the next update of belief and the distance of two consecutive beliefs, resp. The sender uses these objectives
to design the disclosure policies.
In the algorithmic literature, Dughmi and Xu [11] study the offline variant of Bayesian persuasion where
candidates’ valuations are drawn independently from known distributions. In [12, 6], the authors study
algorithms and approximation for Bayesian persuasion with multiple receivers, each with a binary choice of
actions. More recent additions to this literature include, e.g., duality considerations [10] or the study of risk-
conscious agents [1]. In contrast, our approach extends the Bayesian persuasion model with a single sender
and a single receiver in a different direction, by studying an online approach with adversarial valuations and
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random-order arrival.
Somewhat related is previous work in the context of delegation [21]. Here, a principal delegates a search
problem to an agent. Both have individual interests which might be misaligned. The principal can either
accept or reject the agent’s proposed solution and will do so according to a specified mechanism. A key
difference between the two models lies in the commitment power. In our model, the party that observes
the information designs the mechanism while in delegation, the mechanism is designed by the principal who
only has a-priori information. Kleinberg and Kleinberg [24] recently studied how techniques and results from
stochastic online optimization can be used to approximately solve delegation problems. In contrast to our
work, they study application of these techniques to approximately solve an offline delegation problem.
1.2 Model
We consider a Bayesian persuasion problem with online arrival. There is a sender S and a receiver R. A
set of candidates arrives sequentially in n rounds over time in uniform random order. Each candidate comes
with a pair of valuations, one for S and one for R. In the beginning, R knows the set of all these pairs and
that their arrival order is uniform at random. S always knows that the arrival order is uniform at random.
In the basic scenario, she also knows the set of valuation pairs, in the secretary scenario she does not.
In round t, a candidate arrives and a state of nature θt ∈ Θt is revealed to S. We use θ = (θ1, . . . , θn) to
denote the vector of the states of nature revealed in all rounds t ∈ {1, . . . , n} = [n]. Associated with θt is the
pair of non-negative values ξ(θt), ρ(θt) ≥ 0, where ρ(θt) is the utility of R and ξ(θt) is the utility of S when
the candidate gets hired. We use ρ and ξ to denote the vectors of all possible utility values of all candidates
in all states of nature, and ρmax = maxθt ρ(θt) and ξmax = maxθt ξ(θt) as well as cS = argmaxθt ξ(θt) and
cR = argmaxθt ρ(θt).
1 Having observed θt and the corresponding values, S transmits a signal σt to R.
Based on the signal, R then decides whether to hire the current candidate in round t or not. Every decision
is final and cannot be revoked later on. If R decides to hire, the process ends. Otherwise, round t+1 starts
and the next candidate arrives. The process ends by the end of round n at the latest.
Following [11, 22] we assume that there is commitment power, i.e., S shall commit a-priori on a signaling
strategy φ, mapping each partially revealed vector of states of nature (θ1, . . . , θt) to a signal σt, for all t ∈ [n].
The order of events is (1) S commits to a signaling strategy φ, (2) first candidate arrives, (3) S learns θ1
and sends signal φ(θ1) to R, (4) R decides to hire or not, (5) repeat from step (2) with θ2 and φ(θ1, θ2)
etc., until a candidate gets hired or all n candidates arrived. In a scenario without disclosure, the sender’s
signals (φ(θ1), . . . , φ(θ1, . . . , θt)) are the only information for R in the beginning of round t (in addition to
the a-priori information). In a scenario with disclosure, R also gets informed about the rejected candidates
(θ1, . . . , θt−1) in the beginning of round t. Hence, with disclosure R knows the set of remaining candidates
that will arrive in rounds t, . . . , n.
The goal of both S and R is to maximize their individual objective. We consider two variants, for
each S and R: The cardinal objective, where a player strives to maximize the expected utility; and the
ordinal objective, where the sender (receiver) wants to maximize the success probability, i.e., the probability
that the hired candidate is the optimal cS (cR), resp. All probabilities/expectations are with respect to
input randomization and internal randomization of the mechanism. Our mechanisms for S are truthful-in-
expectation mechanisms, where we strive to maximize the sender’s objective.
1For simplicity, we assume w.l.o.g. that for all candidates all utility values ρi and ξi are mutually disjoint.
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Applying a revelation-principle style argument [22, 2], S can restrict herself to a signaling strategy
φ that is direct and persuasive. For direct signals, S directly recommends one candidate for hire, i.e.,
σt ∈ {HIRE,NOT}. A direct mechanism φ is persuasive if R in every round maximizes her expected utility
(from the candidate she hires eventually) by being obedient, i.e., always hiring upon receiving the signal
HIRE and never hiring upon receiving the signal NOT. We assume that ties are broken in favor of S, i.e.,
only when R can strictly increase her success probability/expected utility, there is an incentive to deviate
from the signals of φ.
1.3 Results and Techniques
Our paper provides a comprehensive analysis of sixteen variants of the recommendation problem. For
exposure, we here focus on two canonical cases in which S and R either both have cardinal utilities (cardinal
case) or both have ordinal utilities (ordinal case). Results for the remaining scenarios (e.g., cardinal sender
and ordinal receiver) follow along the same lines. Throughout the paper, all asymptotics are in n, the number
of candidates.
Cardinal Case Our baseline is the basic scenario, where we propose the Pareto mechanism (based on the
Pareto procedure in Algorithm 1), an optimal persuasive mechanism (Proposition 2.1) that determines an
optimal signal based on the Pareto curve of the candidate set. We use the optimal sender utility (denoted
by OPT) in this scenario as a benchmark for the other variants. OPT can differ substantially from ξmax, can
depend on the complete candidate set, and has no immediate closed-form expression. Perhaps interestingly,
in the Pareto mechanism, if the sender-optimal candidate cS offers at least µR = 1n
∑
i ρi to R, then it gets
recommended deterministically. Otherwise, the mechanism will compose a sender-optimal signal that has
expected value µR for R, i.e., does not offer useful information.
In the secretary scenario, S faces a problem with the main characteristics of the secretary problem, i.e.,
unknown candidate values and random-order arrival. The values are only revealed to S once the candidate
arrives. Observe that this scenario strictly generalizes the standard secretary problem. In particular, if
ξi = ρi for every candidate i ∈ [n], the incentives of both players are perfectly aligned. In the basic scenario,
when S knows all candidates upfront, she would simply choose cS = cR and recommend it for hire. Thus,
the benchmark in this case is expected utility OPT = ξmax. It is easy to see that in such instances no
persuasive mechanism in the secretary scenario can beat the 1/e − o(1) guarantee from the classic optimal
algorithm [13].
When the incentives are not perfectly aligned, our mechanisms depart substantially from this classic
template. Here, every persuasive mechanism must guarantee an expected utility for the receiver of µR. The
Pareto mechanism optimizes the sender utility under this constraint. In the secretary scenario, we apply
this technique adaptively to the set of arrived candidates. Perhaps surprisingly, this suffices to generate
a distribution of HIRE signals, which leaves R with no additional information beyond the guarantee of
expected utility µR. We obtain a persuasive mechanism and a (1/(3
√
3) − o(1))-approximation of OPT
(Theorem 2.4).
In the basic scenario with disclosure, we give a characterization of the optimal mechanism using an
exponential family of nested linear programs. In terms of polynomial-time algorithms, we design another
adaptive version of the Pareto mechanism w.r.t. the shrinking set of non-arrived candidates. It obtains an
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without Disclosure with Disclosure
Ordinal S Cardinal S Ordinal S Cardinal S
Basic Optimal mechanism (Prop. 2.1) 1/2 (Thm. 2.11, 2.14) 1/3 (Thm. 2.13)
Secretary 1/4 (Thm. 2.7) 1/(3
√
3) (Thm. 2.4) Θ(1/n) (Thm. 2.15) Θ(1/n) (Cor. 2.17)
Table 1: Approximation guarantees of persuasive mechanisms for cardinal receiver utility discussed in this
paper. All bounds stated without lower-order terms. Results indicated in bold have asymptotically matching
upper bounds.
expected utility for S of at least 1/3− o(1) times OPT (Theorem 2.13).
For the most challenging scenario with disclosure, we show that there are cases in which no persuasive
mechanism can obtain an expected utility of more than 1/n – while in the benchmark scenario the expected
utility is 1/2. Thus, in terms of approximation of OPT, no persuasive mechanism can have a better ap-
proximation ratio than 2/n (Theorem 2.15 and Corollary 2.17) – while 1/n is always achieved by the trivial
strategy of recommending a candidate uniformly at random.
Ordinal Case Our results for the ordinal case are closer to existing results and techniques for the secretary
problem. Our baseline is again the basic scenario. For ordinal utility, the receiver’s only interest is to find
her single best candidate. Without the sender signal this is quite hopeless, especially when n grows large.
Hence, it is not surprising that we can obtain a success probability of 1−o(1) for the sender. The benchmark
is simply the standard benchmark of the secretary problem – the best candidate cS for S. The intuition
applies even in the basic scenario with disclosure – we again obtain success probability of 1 − o(1) for the
sender (Proposition A.4).
In the secretary scenario, we apply a variation of the classic template – we mix the optimal algorithm
for S and for R and decide randomly upfront which version is applied. Although intuitive, it requires some
effort to show that the mix retains persuasiveness for R even when it strongly favors S. The mechanism
yields a success probability of 1/e− o(1) (Theorem A.2).
In contrast, in the secretary scenario with disclosure, such an approach is not sufficient to incentivize R
to follow the mechanism. The first round, in which a best-so-far candidate for R is rejected and revealed,
R learns that the sender-optimal version is used. This can give R an incentive to ignore any upcoming
HIRE signal. Instead, we run the two optimal algorithms in parallel and hire the first candidate that
either algorithm would hire (first-come first-serve). We term this the First-Opt algorithm, and the success
probability for S becomes at least 1/4−o(1). Our main insight is that for negatively correlated utilities, this
algorithm and the guarantee are indeed optimal, which we prove via a generalized dynamic programming
technique (Theorems A.6 and A.7).
1.4 Overview
In Table 1, we summarize the approximation guarantees when R has cardinal utility, in Table 2 the ones
when R has ordinal utility. We view the basic scenario without disclosure as our benchmark scenario.
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without Disclosure with Disclosure
Ordinal S Cardinal S Ordinal S Cardinal S
Basic 1 (Prop. A.1) 1 (Prop. A.1) 1 (Prop. A.4) 1 (Prop. A.4)
Secretary 1/e (Thm. A.2) 1/e (Thm. A.2) 1/4 (Thm. A.6, A.7) 1/4 (Thm. A.6, A.7)
Table 2: Approximation guarantees of persuasive mechanisms for ordinal receiver utility discussed in this
paper. All bounds stated without lower-order terms. Results indicated in bold have asymptotically matching
upper bounds.
Hence, all other entries in both tables represent approximation ratios with respect to the optimal value for
S that can be obtained in this case. In particular, for ordinal sender utility OPT = 1 − o(1), the optimal
success probability in the benchmark scenario. Horizontal comparisons imply whether or not disclosure of
rejected candidates to R comes at a cost for S. Vertical comparisons yield the loss in performance due to
S not knowing valuation pairs upfront. Observe that except for two variants (secretary with disclosure and
cardinal receiver), all bounds are reasonable constants. Hence, when S does not know the future or rejected
candidates are revealed, it usually implies just a limited loss in her expected utility.
We complement the majority of our ratios with asymptotically tight upper bounds. Some of these upper
bounds are new, such as 1/2 in the basic scenario with disclosure, or 1/4 and O(1/n) in the secretary scenario
with disclosure. These bounds imply structural differences between our signaling scenarios and the standard
variant of the secretary problem.
The subsequent technical parts are organized as follows. Section 2 focuses on the case where the receiver
maximizes her expected utility. The techniques in this section depart from the classical secretary problem.
The section discusses the four scenarios of the problem: basic vs. secretary and disclosure vs. non-disclosure.
Each scenario is analyzed for ordinal and cardinal sender utility. We open the section with the benchmark
case (basic, non-disclosure) and conclude with the most complex one (secretary with disclosure). Each
scenario is analyzed for cardinal and ordinal sender utility, respectively. For ordinal receiver utility, we
proceed similarly in Appendix A.
2 Cardinal Utility for R
We consider cardinal receiver utility, i.e., R wants to maximize the expected utility of the hired candidate.
To capture the sender’s value (i.e., her success probability/expected utility), we use the Pareto frontier, a
geometric interpretation of the candidate set. It consists of the upper boundary of the convex hull of the
candidates’ valuations. Hence, for increasing receiver-values, the Pareto frontier is non-increasing in the
sender-values. This means that the value for S of the Pareto curve at ρ = µR is an obvious upper bound on
the sender’s expected utility.
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Algorithm 1: Pareto Procedure
Input: A set of valuation pairs (ρi, ξi)i∈[n]
1 Scale and normalize the candidate values, set µR ←∑ni=1 ρi/n
2 Let P = {(ρi, ξi) | i ∈ {1, . . . , n}} and conv(P) be the convex hull of P
3 Let PC(P) be the Pareto frontier of conv(P)
4 If ρcS ≥ µR, then set a = b = cS ; otherwise, find a, b ∈ {1, . . . , n} s.t. (a, b) is the segment of PC(P)
that intersects with line ρ = µR (see Fig. 1 for an illustration) // a = b possible
5 Determine probability for candidate a:
If ρa = ρb then α← 1; if ρa 6= ρb and ξa = ξb, then α← 0; else α← µ
R−ρb
ρa−ρb .
6 Draw x uniform from [0, 1]. If x ≤ α then c← a, else c← b.
7 return candidate c
2.1 Benchmark: Basic Scenario without Disclosure
In the benchmark scenario we assume that the point set P = {(ρi, ξi) | i ∈ [n]} is known a-priori to both
S and R. Only upon hiring, the identity of the hired candidate becomes known to R. The identity of
rejected candidates is not revealed. Consider the Pareto mechanism. It is based on the Pareto procedure in
Algorithm 1 that computes the best linear combination of points (denoted by OPT) within the convex hull
of P that guarantees at least the average value µR for R. W.l.o.g. this is a linear combination of at most
two points on the Pareto frontier. We interpret the linear combination as the probability distribution to
signal HIRE for the corresponding candidates (see Fig. 1 for an example). The procedure returns the chosen
candidate c. The Pareto mechanism then signals σt = HIRE exactly in the round t in which candidate θt = c
arrives.
We assume that internally the Pareto procedure works with a scaled and normalized version of its input.
First, it scales all values in ξ such that ξmax = 1, and all values in ρ such that ρmax = 1. Second, in case
of ordinal sender utility, it sets ξi′ = 0 for all other candidates i
′ 6= cS . In this way, the procedure can be
applied to both instances with ordinal or cardinal sender utility, and its output is based on a lottery over
candidates that maximizes success probability or expected utility for S, resp. Observe that in the scenarios
discussed below, the procedure is applied with different subsets of candidate values as input. In this case,
the procedure applies the internal adjustment w.r.t. the subset of candidates provided in the input.
Proposition 2.1. The Pareto mechanism is an optimal persuasive mechanism.
Proof. Consider the Pareto mechanism and the event that R gets a signal σt = HIRE in round t. We denote
by x the distribution over candidates in round t conditioned on this event. Clearly x is the same distribution,
no matter in which round t R gets a signal to hire. Now denote by y the distribution over candidates in
round t′ conditioned on a HIRE signal in round t 6= t′. Clearly, y is the same distribution, for any t, t′ with
t 6= t′.
For R, the expected utility of following a HIRE signal is xTρ ≥ µR by construction of the mechanism.
By simply hiring in round 1 deterministically, R gets a value of µR and a HIRE signal with probability 1/n.
Hence, (x + (n − 1)y)Tρ = nµR. Consequently, the expected utility of R for hiring upon a NOT signal is
yTρ ≤ µR. Thus, the mechanism is persuasive.
Now consider any persuasive mechanism φ used by S. Let xi denote the probability that (over random
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 µ OPT
ρ 1 3 6 7 12 13 14 16 9 9
ξ 8 1 10 4 8 5 6 2 6.5 9
ρ
ξ
×
×
×
a
×
×
b
×
×
×
µR

OPT
Figure 1: Geometric interpretation of the Pareto mechanism. The instance has 8 candidates with values as
shown in the table. Candidates a = 3 and b = 5 compose the optimal pair. HIRE signals are sent with
probability (α, 1 − α) = (1/2, 1/2). The optimal expected sender utility is OPT = 9.
arrival and randomization in φ) candidate i ∈ [n] is the first one with signal HIRE. We use x to denote
the vector. Truthfulness of φ implies the following constraints: (1) xTρ ≥ µR, since this expected utility
can be achieved by R simply by hiring in any fixed round; (2) ‖x‖1 ≤ 1, since the mechanism can be
assumed to recommend at most one candidate; (2) ‖x‖1 ≥ 1, since all ρi ≥ 0 at least one candidate must
be recommended (otherwise, R will deviate from φ by hiring in the last round). Hence, the distribution x
resulting from the optimal persuasive mechanism is a feasible solution to the following maximization problem
for the expected sender utility
Max. xT ξ
s.t. xTρ ≥ µR
‖x‖1 = 1
xi ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n
(1)
It is straightforward to see that the Pareto mechanism computes a distribution that represents an optimum
solution to the above LP. Hence, it is an optimal persuasive mechanism.
2.2 Secretary Scenario without Disclosure
The secretary scenario differs from the previous one by S a-priori lacking knowledge of the valuation pairs.
To cope with this challenge, we apply the Pareto procedure adaptively. Our mechanism φ(s) first samples a
number of rounds and signals σt = NOT for rounds t = 1, . . . , s. Then, in each round t = s+1, . . . , n− 1 let
At be the set of all previously arrived candidates, including the one currently under consideration in round
t. The mechanism invokes the Pareto procedure on the set At. It signals σt = HIRE if and only if the
candidate chosen by the Pareto procedure has arrived in the current round t.
When σt = HIRE and R deviates by refusing to hire, the mechanism signals NOT in every subsequent
round. If t = n and the mechanism has not signaled HIRE so far, it sets σn = HIRE deterministically in
the last round. Due to the dependence on a growing candidate set At, we term this mechanism the Growing
Pareto mechanism (see Algorithm 2).
The main results about the Growing Pareto mechanism are as follows. We first show that the mechanism
is persuasive. We then prove the approximation guarantee of 1/4 − o(1) for the ordinal sender utility and
1/(3
√
3)− o(1) for the cardinal sender utility.
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Algorithm 2: Growing Pareto Mechanism
Input: Number of candidates n, sample size s
1 A0 ← ∅
2 for t = 1 to n− 1 do
3 At ← At−1 ∪ {θt}
4 if t ≤ s then Signal NOT
5 else
6 ct ← candidate chosen by Pareto procedure on the set At
7 if ct = θt then Signal HIRE and end mechanism; else Signal NOT
8 Signal HIRE on n-th candidate.
Let us first consider persuasiveness. Consider round t. We follow [23] and rephrase the generation of
the candidate arriving in round t as follows: First choose the subset At of candidates that arrived in rounds
1, . . . , t uniformly at random from [n], then pick the candidate arriving in round t uniformly at random from
At.
Lemma 2.2. Consider a given round t and a given subset of candidates At that arrived up to round t. In
the Growing Pareto mechanism
Pr
[
t−1∧
i=1
σi = NOT
∣∣∣∣∣ At−1
]
=

1 t = 2, . . . , s+ 1s
t−1 t = s+ 2, . . . , n
and
Pr[σt = HIRE | At] =


0 t = 1, . . . , s
1
t · s−1t−1 t = s+ 1, . . . , n− 1
s
n−1 t = n
.
Proof. Given that the set At of candidates arrived up to round t, we draw all possible arrival sequences of
At in the first t rounds in a reverse fashion. For At, the Pareto procedure singles out the candidates a and b.
The candidate it ∈ [n] that arrives in round t is chosen uniformly at random from At. Thus, the probability
is 1t that the candidate is in {a, b} and that in addition the Pareto procedure applied in round t would return
this candidate. For a signal σt = HIRE of the Growing Pareto mechanism, however, it also needs to hold
that σi = NOT for all i ≤ t− 1.
Given candidate set At arrives in the first t rounds and candidate it in round t, consider the signal in
round t− 1. Now given the set At−1 = At \ {it}, the Pareto procedure singles out some candidates a and b.
Since the candidate it−1 arriving in round t − 1 is chosen uniformly at random from At−1, the probability
that the Pareto procedure in round t− 1 results in signal NOT is t−2t−1 .
Suppose in round t− 1 a candidate it−1 arrives and the Pareto procedure results in signal σt−1 = NOT.
Then, we can apply the same argument for round t− 2 and candidate set At−2 = At \ {it, it−1}. Since we
need a NOT signal in all previous rounds i ∈ [t − 1], we continue to apply the argument pointwise for all
subsets Ai. Note that for i ≤ s the probability Pr[σi = NOT] = 1 always.
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Hence, for every set At−1 we obtain
Pr
[
t−1∧
i=1
σi = NOT
∣∣∣∣∣ At−1
]
=
t− 2
t− 1 ·
t− 3
t− 2 · · ·
s
s+ 1
=
s
t− 1
for rounds t = s+ 2, . . . , n. Thus, for rounds t = s+ 1, . . . , n− 1 we see
Pr[σt = HIRE | At] = Eit
[
Pr[σt = HIRE | At, it] · Pr
[
t−1∧
i=1
σi = NOT
∣∣∣∣∣ At \ {it}
]]
=
1
t
· s− 1
t− 1
and, analogously, Pr[σt = HIRE | At] = 1 · sn−1 for t = n.
Lemma 2.3. The Growing Pareto mechanism is persuasive in the secretary scenario without disclosure.
Proof. Suppose the Growing Pareto mechanism sets σt = HIRE in some round t ∈ {s + 1, . . . , n} and
σt′ = NOT for all t
′ ∈ [t − 1]. Note At is a subset chosen uniformly at random. For every i ∈ At, the
probability to receive only signals NOT for At \ {i} in rounds 1, . . . , t − 1 is the same. Hence, by following
the HIRE signal, R obtains an expected utility of
E[ρt | σt = HIRE] ≥ EAt
[∑
i∈At
ρi
t
]
= µR.
Consider the event that R sees only NOT in all rounds up to t− 1. By Lemma 2.2, this event has the same
probability for all subsets At−1. Hence, even conditioned on this event, the candidate arriving in round t is
uniformly distributed. Thus, E
[
ρt
∣∣∣ ∧t−1t′=1 σt′ = NOT] = µR. Therefore, the expected utility of hiring when
NOT is received also in round t is E
[
ρt
∣∣∣ ∧tt′=1 σt′ = NOT] ≤ µR.
Now consider the event that R observes σt = HIRE. For all possible subsets At this event has the same
probability by Lemma 2.2. Hence, for any round r > t, candidate θr is uniformly distributed and gives
expected value of µR. Thus, no r > t yields a profitable deviation. The lemma follows.
We now prove the approximation result, first for the case when S has cardinal utility and aims to
maximize her expected utility. The Growing Pareto mechanism provides a constant-factor approximation to
the optimum in the corresponding benchmark scenario.
Theorem 2.4. In the secretary scenario without disclosure, the Growing Pareto mechanism with s = ⌊n/√3⌋
yields a
(
1
3
√
3
− o(1)
)
-approximation of the optimal expected utility in the corresponding benchmark scenario.
ρ
ξ
µR
a
b
OPT
Figure 2: Solid: Pareto frontier in the adapted
instance in the proof of Lemma 2.5. Dashed:
Lower bound on the Pareto frontier when a and
b remain in the candidate set
The proof of this theorem relies on some auxiliary
observations. Let L = {i ∈ [n] | ρi ≤ µR} and
H = {i ∈ [n] | ρi > µR} = [n] \ L be a partition of
the candidates into the ones with low receiver utility and
high receiver utility, respectively. Let d = |L| denote the
cardinality of L. For the sake of analysis, we assume that
ρmax = 1 and ξmax = 1.
We first concentrate on the case with cardinal sender
utility. Consider the Pareto mechanism in the bench-
mark scenario. If the sender-optimal candidate has re-
ceiver utility ρcS ≥ µR, then a = b. The mechanism will
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wait for this particular candidate and recommend HIRE
deterministically. Otherwise, a 6= b, and OPT is both
expected utility for S and success probability for hiring
cS .
For any subset of candidates M ⊆ [n], we use OPT−M to denote the expected utility for S in the
benchmark scenario with candidate set [n] \M . Similar to OPT−{i}, we define µR−i = 1n−1
(∑n
j=1 ρj − ρi
)
for i ∈ [n].
Lemma 2.5. Consider an instance of the benchmark scenario with candidate set [n]. Let a and b be the
candidates as determined in the Pareto procedure. It holds that∑
i6=a,b
OPT−{i} ≥ (n− 3)OPT .
Proof. Consider the signaling scheme computed by the Pareto mechanism. If we adapt the instance and set
ξj = 0 for all j 6= a, b, this does not change OPT, but it can only worsen the optima OPT−{i}. Hence, in
the new instance, the Pareto frontier of the convex hull of P consists only of the (at most) two points for
candidates a, b, and a point for candidate (maxi ρi, 0) and the point (0,maxi ξi) = (0, ξa) (see Fig. 2). As
described above, we partition the candidate set into the sets L and H and set d = |L|. The resulting value
OPT−{i} is different depending on the candidate i that gets removed from the pool. We underestimate the
Pareto frontier with a line to (ρmax, 0) (see the dashed line in Fig. 2). More formally, to estimate the loss
in expected utility, use the slope OPTρmax−µR from the point (µ
R,OPT) representing the optimum to the point
with maximal receiver value. The loss in sender utility caused by the change µR−i−µR =
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
ρj
n−1−µR
can be bounded by
∑
i∈L\{a}
OPT−OPT−{i} ≤ OPT
ρmax − µR
∑
i∈L

 ∑
j∈[n]\{i}
ρj
n− 1 − µ
R


=
1
n− 1 ·
OPT
ρmax − µR
∑
i∈L

 ∑
j∈L\{i}
ρj +
∑
j∈H
ρj − (n− 1)µR


=
OPT
(n− 1)(ρmax − µR)
∑
j∈H
(
ρj − µR
)
≤ OPT
(n− 1)(ρmax − µR)
∑
j∈H
(
ρmax − µR
)
=
n− d
(n− 1) OPT ≤ OPT .
If a candidate i ∈ H arrives, µR−i ≤ µR, and thus the expected payoff for S can only increase. We can lower
bound the payoff by OPT, c.f. Fig. 2, i.e.∑
i∈H\{b}
OPT−OPT−{i} ≤ 0.
Overall, this implies
(n− 2) ·OPT−
∑
i∈[n]\{a,b}
OPT−{i} ≤ OPT
which implies the lemma.
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Let OPTt be the expected value of the Pareto mechanism when applied to the benchmark scenario
composed of the random subset At. Note that OPTn = OPT, the optimum in the benchmark scenario.
Corollary 2.6. For t ≥ 3 it holds that
OPTt ≥
n∏
k=t+1
(
1− 3
k
)
OPT =
t(t− 1)(t− 2)
n(n− 1)(n− 2) OPT .
Proof. We can generate the random set At by starting with [n] and iteratively removing a random candidate.
Note that for t = n− 1 we have by Lemma 2.5
OPTn−1 =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
OPT−{i} ≥ 1
n
∑
i∈[n]\{a,b}
OPT−{i} ≥ n− 3
n
OPT .
The result for t < n− 1 follows by repeated application.
Finally, we prove Theorem 2.4, the approximation result for cardinal sender utility.
Proof of Theorem 2.4. By combining the insights of Corollary 2.6 and Lemma 2.2, we see that in a given
round t = s + 1, . . . , n − 1 the Growing Pareto mechanism obtains an expected utility for S of at least
Pr[σt = HIRE] · OPTt. For simplicity, we underestimate the utility in the last round t = n by 0. For the
expected utility of S, we use linearity of expectation over all rounds and set s = ⌊c · n⌋ for a constant c:
n−1∑
t=s+1
1
t
· s
t− 1 ·
t(t− 1)(t− 2)
n(n− 1)(n− 2) OPT = OPT ·
s
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
n−1∑
t=s+1
(t− 2)
= OPT · s
n(n− 1)(n− 2) ·
(
n(n− 1)
s
− s(s+ 1)
2
− 2(n− 1− s)
)
= OPT ·
(
s
n− 2 −
s2(s+ 1)
2n(n− 1)(n− 2) −
2s(n− 1− s)
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
)
= OPT · (c− c3 − o(1)) .
The last expression is maximized at c = 1√
3
, so we set s = ⌊n/√3⌋. The theorem follows.
We now proceed to the approximation result for ordinal sender utility.
Theorem 2.7. In the secretary scenario without disclosure, the Growing Pareto mechanism with s = ⌊n/2⌋
yields a success probability of at least
(
1
4 − o(1)
)
times the success probability in the corresponding benchmark
scenario.
We use the same notation as for the cardinal case above. In addition, let ρ2nd denote the second highest
utility of any candidate for R. For the Growing Pareto mechanism, the Pareto procedure requires cardinal
values for all candidates in At. Since we assume ordinal sender utility, we set the sender utility to 1 for the
best known candidate for S in At, and 0 otherwise. Note that then OPT becomes both – expected utility
for S and success probability for hiring cS . In step 1, the Pareto procedure then applies internal scaling and
normalization to At (as discussed above in Section 2). It scales the receiver utilities from the input such that
the best known candidate for R in At is normalized to receiver utility 1.
The next Lemma 2.8 represents an improved version of Lemma 2.5. Throughout the following analysis,
we use OPT−M to denote the probability of hiring the best candidate for S in [n] \M .
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Lemma 2.8. Let OPT and OPT−{i} denote the expected utility in the benchmark scenario for candidate
sets [n] and [n] \ {i}, respectively. Then, the following holds:∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}+OPT ·OPT−{cR} ≥ OPT
(
n− 2− 1
n− 1
)
.
Proof. For the first case, we assume that the sender-optimal candidate cS has receiver utility ρcS ≤ µR ≤
ρ2nd. In this case, the Pareto procedure sets a = cS and b = cR, since cS is the only candidate with non-zero
utility for S and has receiver utility below µR. Since all other candidates have sender utility 0, the convex
hull is composed of the segment between sender- and receiver-optimal candidates cS and cR.
The resulting value OPT−{i} is different depending on the candidate that gets removed from the pool.
If a candidate i ∈ L with ρi ≤ µR is removed, then µR−i ≥ µR, which implies that OPT−{i} ≤ OPT. Note
that upon removal of b, we have OPT−{b} = 1 if µR−b ≤ ρa. Otherwise, the new optimum point is located at
µR−b and has value OPT−{b} =
ρ2nd−µR−b
µ2nd−ρa . Overall, we see that∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}+OPT ·OPT−{cR}
=
∑
i∈L\{a}
OPT−{i}+
∑
i∈H\{b}
OPT−{i}+OPT ·min
{
1,
ρ2nd − µR−b
ρ2nd − ρa
}
= OPT

(d− 1)− 1
(n− 1)(1− µR)
∑
i∈L\{a}
(
µR − ρi
)
+ (n− d− 1)
+
∑
i∈H\{b}
min
{
ρi − µR
(n− 1)(1− µR) ,
µR − ρa
1− µR
}
+
ρ2nd − µR−b
ρ2nd − ρa


≥ OPT
[
(n− 2)− 1
(n− 1)(1− µR)
∑
i∈L
(
µR − ρi
)
+
∑
i∈H\{b}
min
{
ρi − µR
(n− 1)(1− µR) ,
µR − ρa
1− µR
}
+
ρ2nd − µR
ρ2nd − ρa


= OPT
[
(n− 2) + ρ2nd − µ
R
ρ2nd − ρa −
1
n− 1
− 1
(n− 1)(1− µR)
∑
i∈H\{b}
((
ρi − µR
)−min{ρi − µR, (µR − ρa)(n− 1)})

 .
We consider two subcases.
Subcase µR < ρ2nd+(n−1)ρan : Here, we see∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}+OPT ·OPT−{cR}
≥ OPT
[
(n− 2) + ρ2nd − µ
R
ρ2nd − ρa −
1
n− 1
− 1
(n− 1)(1− µR)
∑
i∈H\{b}
((
ρi − µR
)−min{ρi − µR, (µR − ρa)(n− 1)})


14
≥ OPT
[
(n− 2) + 1− µ
R − ρa
ρ2nd − ρa −
1
n− 1 −
n− 2
n− 1
]
≥ OPT
[
n− 2− 1
n
]
.
For the penultimate line we used that ρi ≤ 1 and the min is at least 0. In the last inequality, we used
the assumption that µR < ρ2nd+(n−1)ρan and thus
− µ
R − ρa
ρ2nd − ρa ≥ −
ρ2nd − ρa
n(ρ2nd − ρa) = −
1
n
.
Subcase µR ≥ ρ2nd+(n−1)ρan : In this case, we see∑
i∈H\{b}
((
ρi − µR
)−min{ρi − µR, (µR − ρa)(n− 1)}) = 0
as ρi ≤ ρ2nd for all i ∈ H \ {b} and ρ2nd − µR ≤ (µR − ρa)(n− 1). Thus,∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}+OPT ·OPT−{cR}
≥ OPT
[
(n− 2) + ρ2nd − µ
R
ρ2nd − ρa −
1
n− 1
− 1
(n− 1)(1− µR)
∑
i∈H\{b}
((
ρi − µR
)−min{ρi − µR, (µR − ρa)(n− 1)})


= OPT
[
(n− 2) + ρ2nd − µ
R
ρ2nd − ρa −
1
n− 1
]
≥ OPT
[
n− 2− 1
n− 1
]
.
Now, consider the second case in which the sender-optimal candidate cS has receiver utility ρcS , ρ2nd ≤
µR. Again, in this case the Pareto procedure chooses a = cS and b = cR. We can bound as follows∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}+OPT ·OPT−{cR} =
∑
i∈L\{a}
OPT−{i}+OPT ·OPT−{cR}
≥ (n− 2)OPT− 1
(n− 1)(1− µR)
∑
i∈L
(
µR − ρi
)
=
(
n− 2− 1
n− 1
)
OPT .
Finally, consider the third case, cS has ρcS > µ
R. Then, the Pareto procedure chooses a = b = cS , and
OPT−cR = 1. We can bound as follows∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}+OPT =
∑
i∈L
OPT−{i}+
∑
i∈H\{cS ,cR}
OPT−{i}+OPT
≥ OPT
(
d− 1
(n− 1)(1− µR)
∑
i∈L
(
µR − ρi
))
+
∑
i∈H\{cS ,cR}
OPT+OPT
≥ OPT
(
n− 1− 1
(n− 1)(1− µR) (n− d)
(
1− µR))
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≥ (n− 2)OPT ≥
(
n− 2− 1
n− 1
)
OPT .
Let OPTt be the success probability of the Pareto mechanism when applied to the benchmark scenario
with random subset At. We can repeatedly apply Lemma 2.8 in the same way as Lemma 2.5 in Corollary 2.6
above.
Corollary 2.9. For all t ∈ [n] it holds that OPTt ≥ (t−2)(t−1)(n−2)(n−1) OPT .
Proof. The random subset At can be generated by starting from the candidate set [n] and iteratively removing
a candidate picked uniformly at random. In a single step
OPTn−1 =
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
OPT−{i} =
1
n
∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}+
1
n
OPT−{cR}
≥ 1
n
∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}+
1
n
OPT ·OPT−{cR} ≥
n− 2− 1n−1
n
·OPT
due to OPT−{cS} = 0, OPT ≤ 1, and Lemma 2.8. Repeated application of this property implies
OPTt ≥ OPT
n∏
k=t+1
k − 2− 1k−1
k
≥ OPT
n∏
k=t+1
k − 3
k − 1
= OPT · t− 2
t
· t− 1
t+ 1
· t
t+ 2
· · · · · n− 4
n− 2 ·
n− 3
n− 1 = OPT ·
(t− 2)(t− 1)
(n− 2)(n− 1) .
Now, using Lemma 2.8 and Corollary 2.9, Theorem 2.7 can be proved similar as Theorem 2.4 above.
Proof of Theorem 2.7. In a given round t = s+1, . . . , n−1, the Growing Pareto mechanism obtains a success
probability of at least Pr[σt = HIRE] · OPTt. We underestimate the success probability in round n by 0.
Using linearity of expectation and choosing a sample size s = ⌊c · n⌋ with a constant c, we obtain
n−1∑
t=s+1
1
t
· s
t− 1 ·
(t− 1)(t− 2)
(n− 1)(n− 2) OPT = OPT ·
s
(n− 1)(n− 2)
n−1∑
t=s+1
t− 2
t
= OPT ·
(
s
n− 2 −
s2
(n− 1)(n− 2) −
2s · (Hn−1 −Hs+1)
(n− 1)(n− 2)
)
= OPT · (c− c2 − o(1)) .
Here, Hk =
∑k
i=1 1/i is the k-th harmonic number. The last expression is maximized at c = 1/2, therefore
we choose s = ⌊n/2⌋. The theorem follows.
2.3 Basic Scenario with Disclosure
In this section, we consider the basic scenario in which rejected candidates are revealed to R. We give
a characterization of the optimal mechanism using backwards induction. We then show that there are
instances in which no online mechanism can achieve more than a fraction of 1/2 of OPT, i.e., the success
probability/expected utility obtained in the benchmark scenario. We describe and analyze the polynomial-
time persuasive Shrinking Pareto mechanism. It obtains a constant-factor approximation of OPT with a
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ratio of 1/2− o(1) (hence, asymptotically optimal) for ordinal sender utility. For cardinal sender utility the
ratio is 1/3− o(1).
Let us start by deriving an optimal mechanism via backwards induction. Again, we utilize the results
obtained in the case of cardinal sender utility to express bounds for the ordinal sender case. By setting
ξmax = 1 and ξi = 0 for all sender-suboptimal candidates i 6= cS , success probability and expected utility are
the same value. Hence, the following result holds for both sender objectives. For simplicity, we state and
prove the theorem for cardinal sender utility.
An optimal mechanism for the scenario can be computed by backward induction and solution of a series
of linear programs. These programs express the optimal decision given a subset C ⊆ [n] of candidates and
given the optimal decision policy computed for each subset C \ {i}, for every i ∈ C. It is an interesting open
problem whether there is a more intricate, polynomial-time algorithm to compute the optimal persuasive
mechanism in this scenario.
Theorem 2.10. An optimal persuasive mechanism for the sender’s expected utility in the basic scenario
with disclosure can be computed by solving 2n linear programs.
Proof. Suppose we reach the beginning of round t with a set C of n− t+1 remaining candidates. For every
candidate i ∈ C, suppose the sender sees candidate i in round t and has computed the signaling policy for
an optimal persuasive mechanism for rounds t+ 1, . . . , n and subset C \ {i}.
Clearly, in round t = n the sender should set σn = HIRE with probability 1. This is the only persuasive
signaling scheme. Now suppose we are in round t < n. We denote by
xCi = Pr[σt = HIRE | i ∈ C arrives in round t].
In case i is not hired although S signaled HIRE, S will never signal HIRE again. Let uSC\{i} be the expected
utility of S from the optimal persuasive mechanism applied from round t + 1 onwards with candidate set
C \ {i}. Similarly, we define uRC\{i} for R. Assuming the signaling scheme φ determined by x is persuasive,
then the expected utility obtained by S
1
|C|
∑
i∈C
(xCi ξi + (1− xCi ) · uSC\{i})
is the objective function of a linear program. In this LP we have the obvious constraints xCi ∈ [0, 1],
and two constraints on x that ensure persuasiveness. Suppose R gets signal HIRE. This happens with
total probability Pr[σt = HIRE | C] =
∑
i∈C x
C
i /|C|. We assume w.l.o.g. that this probability is positive,
otherwise there is nothing to prove. The probability that the recommended candidate is i is phi =
xCi∑
j∈C x
C
j
.
Upon compliance with the HIRE signal, R gets a utility of ∑i∈C phi ρi. Upon deviation, the candidate is
rejected and S stops to signal HIRE. Thus, the expected utility of R becomes ∑i∈C phi · 1|C|−1 ∑j∈C\{i} ρj .
Hence, persuasiveness requires ∑
i∈C
phi ρi ≥
∑
i∈C
phi ·
1
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
ρj
⇔
∑
i∈C
xCi ρi ≥
∑
i∈C
xCi ·
1
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
ρj
⇔
∑
i∈C
xCi

ρi − 1|C| − 1 ∑
j∈C\{i}
ρj

 ≥ 0
(2)
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Similarly, R should not have an incentive to accept a candidate upon the event of σt = NOT. We again
assume that the probability of this event is positive. The probability that upon a NOT signal the sender
sees candidate i is pnhi =
1−xCi∑
j∈C(1−xCj )
. Upon deviation and hiring the candidate, R gets utility ∑i∈C pnhi ρi.
Upon following the signal, R gets a utility of ∑i∈C pnhi uRC\{i}. Hence, persuasiveness requires∑
i∈C
pnhi u
R
C\{i} ≥
∑
i∈C
pnhi · ρi
⇔
∑
i∈C
(1− xCi )uRC\{i} ≥
∑
i∈C
(1− xCi ) · ρi
(3)
Claim 1. Constraint (3) is redundant and implied by (2).
We show the claim below. Thus, we get the following family of linear programs to determine uSC :
max
x
1
|C|
∑
i∈C
(xCi ξi + (1 − xCi ) · uSC\{i}) (4a)
s.t.
∑
i∈C
xCi

ρi − 1|C| − 1 ∑
j∈C\{i}
ρj

 ≥ 0 (4b)
xCi ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ C (4c)
Proof of Claim 1. Every solution x that satisfies (3) for some values for uRC\{i} also fulfills it for pointwise
larger values. This is clear since with expected utility in subsequent rounds becoming larger, R does not get
incentive to deviate from a NOT signal and hire in round t.
Recall that R can always ignore all signals and hire a random candidate. Hence, clearly, uRC\{i} ≥
1
|C|−1
∑
j∈C\{i} ρj . The pointwise smallest values u
R
C\{i} =
1
|C|−1
∑
j∈C\{i} ρj imply for the constraint
∑
i∈C
(1− xCi ) ·
1
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
ρj ≥
∑
i∈C
(1− xCi ) · ρi
⇔
∑
i∈C
xCi

ρi − 1|C| − 1 ∑
j∈C\{i}
ρj

 ≥ 0 (5)
What reduction of utility does S suffer when rejected candidates are announced to R? The following
theorem shows an upper bound of 12 .
Theorem 2.11. For every ε > 0, there is an instance such that every persuasive mechanism in the basic
scenario with disclosure guarantees at most a fraction of
(
1
2 + ε
)
of the optimum in the benchmark scenario.
This holds for both cardinal as well as ordinal sender utility.
Proof. Consider the following class of instances. Candidate 1 has value (ρ1, ξ1) = (
n−2
n−1 , 1), candidate 2 has
value (ρ2, ξ2) = (0, 0), and candidates i = 3, . . . , n have values (ρi, ξi) = (1, 0). Hence, this can be seen as
an instance for ordinal as well as cardinal sender utility. In the remainder of the proof, we will only use
“expected utility”.
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In the benchmark case, the Pareto mechanism would pick a = b = 1 and signal HIRE if and only if
candidate 1 arrives. This would yield an expected utility of 1 for S and n−2n−1 for R.
For the announcement case, constraint (4b) implies that xC2 = 0 is optimal for all C ∋ 2, i.e., an optimal
mechanism never recommends to hire 2. S has no value for candidates other than 1, so w.l.o.g. the optimal
mechanism will always try to recommend 1 with xC1 = 1 for every C ∋ 1. For every subset C 6∋ 1, the utility
is 0, and we can assume that xCi = 1 for all i ∈ C, i 6= 2.
Let k =
√
n, and consider the event E that the following two conditions are satisfied: (1) at least one
of candidates {1, 2} arrives within the first n − k rounds, and (2) candidate 2 arrives before candidate 1.
Suppose we draw two arrival rounds for candidates 1 and 2 uniformly at random. The probability that we
draw both rounds from the last k rounds is p = kn · k−1n−1 . For any set of two rounds drawn uniformly at
random, the probability that 2 arrives in the earlier one is 1/2. Thus,
Pr[E] =
1
2
− k(k − 1)
2n(n− 1) .
Suppose candidate 2 arrives in round t. Since 2 is always rejected, consider any subsequent round t + 1.
The set C of remaining candidates consists only of candidate 1 and a subset of candidates 3, . . . , n. Since
the latter are symmetric, the optimal mechanism uses the same value xCi = x
C
j = x
C
−1 for all candidates
i, j ∈ C \ {1}. The optimal mechanism needs to satisfy (4b)
(|C| − 1) · xC−1 ·
(
1− 1|C| − 1 ·
(
|C| − 2 + n− 2
n− 1
))
+ xC1 ·
(
n− 2
n− 1 −
1
|C| − 1 · (|C| − 1)
)
≥ 0 .
Using the assumption that xC1 = 1 and solving for x
C
−1 implies
xC−1 ≥ 1 .
Hence, after candidate 2 is rejected in round t, there is an optimal mechanism that signals HIRE with
probability 1 in round t+1. The probability that candidate 1 is hired in this round is only 1/|C| ≤ 1/(k − 1).
Note that this upper bound holds even conditioned on event E, since the round in which 1 arrives remains
uniformly distributed among the remaining ones. Thus, the overall expected utility of the optimal mechanism
in the disclosure case is upper bounded by
(1− Pr[E]) · 1 + Pr[E] · 1
k − 1 ≤
1
2
+
k(k − 1)
2n(n− 1) +
1
2(k − 1) −
k
2n(n− 1) =
1
2
+ o(1)
since k =
√
n.
We now turn to our polynomial-time approximation mechanism for this scenario. It is another variant
of the Pareto mechanism, termed Shrinking Pareto mechanism (see Algorithm 3). The Shrinking Pareto
mechanism applies the Pareto procedure adaptively to the set of remaining candidates Rt. The mechanism
signals HIRE in round t if and only if the candidate chosen by the Pareto procedure on Rt is the one arriving
in round t.
We establish three properties of the Shrinking Pareto mechanism. We show that the mechanism is
persuasive, it yields a (1/3−o(1))-approximation for cardinal sender utility, and a (1/2−o(1))-approximation
for ordinal sender utility.
Lemma 2.12. The Shrinking Pareto mechanism is persuasive in the basic scenario with disclosure.
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Algorithm 3: Shrinking Pareto Mechanism
Input: Pairs of candidate values (ρi, ξi)i∈[n]
1 R1 ← [n]
2 for t = 1 to n do
3 ct ← candidate chosen by Pareto procedure on the set Rt
4 if ct = θt then Signal HIRE and end mechanism
5 else Rt+1 ← Rt \ {θt} and signal NOT
Proof. Recall from our analysis above that the probabilities for a signal σt = HIRE resulting from the Pareto
procedure are chosen as a linear combination, which yields at least an expected utility of µR to R. Formally,
consider the decision of R in round t conditioned on a subset Rt of remaining candidates. Suppose the
mechanism sends HIRE. Then, the expected utility for R is
E[ρ(θt) | σt = HIRE ∧Rt] ≥ 1|Rt|
∑
i∈Rt
ρi .
We use xRti = Pr[σt = HIRE | Rt ∧ (θt = i ∈ Rt)], i.e., the probability that the set Rt remains to arrive in
rounds t, . . . , n and i ∈ Rt arrives in round t. For the Pareto procedure we have
∑
i∈Rt x
Rt
i = 1, thus
1
|Rt|
∑
i∈Rt
ρi =
1
|Rt|
∑
i∈Rt
xRti
∑
j∈Rt
ρj =
1
|Rt|
∑
i∈Rt
xRti
∑
j∈Rt\{i}
ρj +
1
|Rt|
∑
i∈Rt
xRti ρi .
Therefore ∑
i∈Rt
xRti ρi ≥
1
|Rt| − 1
∑
i∈Rt
xRti
∑
j∈Rt\{i}
ρj .
The signaling probabilities xRti of the Shrinking Pareto mechanism represent a feasible solution for every
linear program (4). Hence, the mechanism is persuasive.
The following theorem is our main result for cardinal sender utility. The Shrinking Pareto mechanism
guarantees a constant-factor approximation of the optimal utility achieved in the benchmark scenario. It is
an interesting open question to prove a tight bound in this scenario.
Theorem 2.13. In the basic scenario with disclosure, the Shrinking Pareto mechanism scenario obtains a(
1
3 − o(1)
)
-approximation of the optimum in the corresponding benchmark scenario.
Proof. Consider an instance of the benchmark scenario with n candidates. We use OPT to denote the
optimal expected utility of S achieved by the Pareto mechanism. Consider the same instance in the public
announcement scenario, and let SP be the expected utility of S achieved by the Shrinking Pareto mechanism.
We denote by θt the candidate arriving in round t. Consider the first round t = 1 and the application
of the Pareto procedure. Obviously, σ1 = HIRE with probability
1
n , and the expected utility E[ξθ1 | σ1 =
HIRE] = OPT.
Now suppose σ1 = NOT. For every subset S ⊆ [n], let OPT−S and SP−S be the expected utility of
S achieved by the (Shrinking) Pareto mechanism on the benchmark (disclosure) instance with candidates
[n] \ S, respectively. For the expected value of the Shrinking Pareto mechanism we can derive the following
20
recursive lower bound
1
n
∑
i∈[n]
Pr[θ1 = i, σ1 = HIRE] · ξi + Pr[θ1 = i, σ1 = NOT] · SP−{i}
=
OPT
n
+
1
n

(1− α) SP−{a}+α SP−{b}+ ∑
i6=a,b
SP−{i}


≥ OPT
n
+
1
n
∑
i6=a,b
SP−{i}
≥ OPT
n
+
1
n
∑
i6=a,b

 1
n− 1
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
Pr[θ2 = j, σ2 = HIRE] · ξj + Pr[θ2 = j, σ2 = NOT] · SP−{i,j}


≥ OPT
n
+
1
n

∑
i6=a,b
OPT−i
n− 1 +
1
n− 1
∑
i∈[n]\{a,b}
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
Pr[θ2 = j, σ2 = NOT] · SP−{i,j}


≥ OPT
n
+
∑
i6=a,b
OPT−{i}
n(n− 1) +
∑
i∈[n]\{a,b}
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
j 6=a−i,b−i
OPT−{i,j}
n(n− 1)(n− 2) + . . .
where a−i, b−i are the candidates a and b identified by the Pareto procedure when applied to the candidate
set [n] \ {i}. Applying the lower bound on ∑i6=a,bOPT−i from Lemma 2.5 repeatedly in the formula above,
we obtain
OPT
n
+
∑
i6=a,b
OPT−{i}
n(n− 1) +
∑
i∈[n]\{a,b}
∑
j∈[n]\{i}
j 6=a−i,b−i
OPT−{i,j}
n(n− 1)(n− 2) + . . .
≥ OPT
n
+
n− 3
n(n− 1) OPT+
∑
i∈[n]\{a,b}
n− 4
n(n− 1)(n− 2) OPT−{i}+ . . .
≥ OPT · 1
n(n− 1)(n− 2)
(
n−3∑
i=1
(n− i)(n− i− 1)
)
= OPT ·
(
1
3
− 2
n3 − 3n2 + 2n
)
.
For the ordinal case, we show a bound that asymptotically matches the upper bound shown in Theo-
rem 2.11. In contrast to the cardinal case, this implies that the approximation guarantee of our mechanism is
asymptotically optimal. The proof is conceptually similar to the previous theorem, but instead of Lemma 2.5
relies on the improved guarantee in Lemma 2.8.
Theorem 2.14. The Shrinking Pareto mechanism yields a success probability of at least
(
1
2 − o(1)
)
in the
basic scenario with disclosure.
Proof. Let SP be the success probability from the Shrinking Pareto mechanism. We show that
SP ≥ OPT ·
(
1
2
− 1
2n
)
.
The utility obtained in a round depends on the current candidate. With probability 1n , the current candidate
is a. The signal HIRE is sent with probability α = OPT. With probability 1 − OPT, NOT is sent.
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Analogously, if the current candidate is b, NOT is sent with probability OPT while the signal is HIRE with
probability 1 − OPT. Any other candidate is guaranteed to get a signal NOT. In the following, we denote
by SP−M for any subset M of candidates the expected utility from the Shrinking Pareto mechanism for the
instance [n] \M . We apply Lemma 2.8 recursively and obtain
SP =
1
n
OPT+
1
n
OPT ·SP−{cR} +
1
n
∑
i6=cS ,cR
SP−{i}
=
OPT
n
+
OPT
n

 1
n− 1 OPT−{cR}+
1
n− 1 OPT−{cR} ·SP−{cR,c′R} +
1
n− 1
∑
i6=cS ,cR,c′R
SP−{cR,i}


+
1
n
∑
i6=cS ,cR

 1
n− 1 OPT−{i}+
1
n− 1 OPT−{i} SP−{i,cR} +
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=cS ,cR,i
SP−{i,j}


=
OPT
n
+
OPT
n
· OPT−{cR}
n− 1 +
1
n
∑
i6=cS ,cR
OPT−{i}
n− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥ 1
n(n−1)
·OPT ·(n−2− 1n−1)
+
OPT
n
· OPT−{cR}
n− 1 · SP−{cR,c′R}
+
OPT
n
1
n− 1
∑
i6=cS ,cR,c′R
SP−{cR,i} +
1
n
∑
i6=cS ,cR
1
n− 1 OPT−{i} ·SP−{i,cR}
+
1
n
1
n− 1
∑
i6=cS ,cR
∑
j 6=cS ,cR,i
SP−{i,j}
≥ OPT
n
+
1
n
1
n− 1 ·
(
n− 2− 1
n− 1
)
·OPT+OPT
n
· OPT−{cR}
n− 1 · SP−{cR,c′R}
≥ OPT
n
[
1 +
1
n− 1
(
n− 2− 1
n− 1
)
+
1
n− 1
1
n− 2 ·
(
n− 2− 1
n− 1
)(
n− 3− 1
n− 2
)
+ . . .
]
+ . . .
≥ OPT
(
1
2
− 1
2n
)
.
2.4 Secretary Scenario with Disclosure
Finally, consider the secretary scenario with disclosure and cardinal receiver utility. In this scenario, S
does not have any information on the valuation pairs. Moreover, the rejected candidates are revealed to
R. Initially, R has the same information as usual (knows all valuation pairs, knows they arrive in random
order, knows mechanism φ). At the end of each round with a rejection, R also learns the valuation pair of
the candidate she just rejected.
Obviously, S can apply the trivial mechanism: Recommending a candidate chosen uniformly at random.
This mechanism is persuasive. It achieves a success probability 1/n and an expected utility of 1/n · ξmax, a
trivial lower bound.
We complement this insight with a strong upper bound for a sender with ordinal utility. The subsequent
Corollary 2.17 shows a similar bound when the sender has cardinal utility.
Theorem 2.15. In the secretary scenario with disclosure, there is no persuasive mechanism that guarantees
S a success probability greater than 2n · OPT, where OPT is the success probability in the corresponding
benchmark instance.
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The lower bound follows from the following two different instances. In both instances, there is one
candidate a with value-pair (ρa, ξa) = (0, 1) and n − 2 indistinguishable candidates (each termed c) with
value-pair (1/2, 0). In instance I, there is one additional candidate b with value-pair (1, 0). In instance II,
there is just another c-candidate with (1/2, 0).
Hence, the only uncertainty for S in this set of instances is about the existence of b.
Now consider an arbitrary persuasive mechanism. Clearly, we can assume that the mechanism issues
exactly one HIRE signal in exactly one of the rounds t ∈ [n]. If this signal is not followed, it just issues
NOT signals. This can only increase the incentive for R to follow the HIRE signal. We always assume that
the mechanism issues a HIRE signal in the last round if it has not done so before. This is just a standard
assumption. Note that in the last round, the arriving candidate is perfectly known to R.
Now consider round t = 3, . . . , n − 1. Suppose the mechanism has only sent NOT signals so far. Based
on the set of candidates At−1 that arrived up to and including round t− 1 (and whose arrival is now known
to both S and R), we distinguish eight cases.
θt a a b b c c c c
Candidates in At−1 only c b, c only c a, c only c a, c b, c a, b, c
Pr[σt = HIRE | At−1, θt] pta,c pta,b ptb,c ptb,a ptc,c ptc,a ptc,b 1
Note that, obviously, in the last case when both a and b arrived and were rejected, it is clear to both S
and R that the underlying instance is instance I and there are only candidates c to come in the subsequent
rounds. Hence, in this case we can w.l.o.g. assume that S issues a HIRE signal directly. In round t = 2, this
case does not exist:
θ2 a a b b c c c
Candidate θ1 c b c a c a b
Pr[σ2 = HIRE | θ1, θ2] p2a,c p2a,b p2b,c p2b,a p2c,c p2c,a p2c,b
Finally, for round t = 1, there are only three cases depending on whether θ1 is a, b or c. We denote the
probabilities for a HIRE signal by p1a, p
1
b and p
1
c , respectively.
In the next lemma, we show necessary constraints for persuasiveness.
Lemma 2.16. For every mechanism that is persuasive in both instances I and II, it must hold for round
t = 1
p1b ≥ p1a and p1c ≥ p1a
and for every round t = 2, . . . , n− 1
ptb,c ≥ pta,c ptb,a ≥ ptc,a ptc,b ≥ pta,b ptc,c ≥ pta,c .
Proof. Suppose there is a HIRE signal in round t. R must find it in her interest to follow the signal. More
precisely, in what follows we condition on σt = HIRE. Now, for persuasiveness the expected utility from θt
must exceed the expected utility from θt+1.
First, consider round t = 1:
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Instance I: We must have E[ρθ1 | σ1 = HIRE] ≥ E[ρθ2 | σ1 = HIRE], which implies
p1a · 0 + p1b · 1 + (n− 2) · p1c · 1/2
≥ p1a ·
(n− 2) · 1/2 + 1
n− 1 + p
1
b ·
(n− 2) · 1/2
n− 1 + (n− 2) · p
1
c ·
(n− 3) · 1/2 + 1
n− 1
The constraint becomes p1b ≥ p1a.
Instance II: We must have E[ρθ1 | σ1 = HIRE] ≥ E[ρθ2 | σ1 = HIRE], which implies
p1a · 0 + (n− 1) · p1c · 1/2 ≥ p1a · 1/2 + (n− 1) · p1c ·
(n− 2) · 1/2
n− 1
The constraint becomes p1c ≥ p1a.
Hence, the mechanism must be more likely to signal HIRE in round 1 for each c and b than for a.
Technically, these two constraints also hold for round t = n, since the probability to signal HIRE is 1 for
every candidate. The two constraints also emerge in the remaining rounds t = 2, . . . , n− 1:
Instance I, At−1 contains only c: E[ρθt | σt = HIRE] ≥ E[ρθt+1 | σt = HIRE] implies
pta,c · 0 + ptb,c · 1 + (n− t− 1) · ptc,c · 1/2
≥ pta,c ·
(n− t− 1) · 1/2 + 1
n− t + p
t
b,c ·
(n− t− 1) · 1/2
n− t + (n− t− 1) · p
t
c,c ·
(n− t− 2) · 1/2 + 1
n− t
Observe that the ptc,c terms cancel, and the constraint becomes p
t
b,c ≥ pta,c.
Instance I, At−1 contains a: E[ρθt | σt = HIRE] ≥ E[ρθt+1 | σt = HIRE] implies
ptb,a · 1 + (n− t) · ptc,a · 1/2 ≥ ptb,a · 1/2 + (n− t) · ptc,a ·
(n− t− 1) · 1/2 + 1
n− t
The constraint becomes ptb,a ≥ ptc,a.
Instance I, At−1 contains b: E[ρθt | σt = HIRE] ≥ E[ρθt+1 | σt = HIRE] implies
pta,b · 0 + (n− t) · ptc,b · 1/2 ≥ pta,b · 1/2 + (n− t) · ptc,b ·
(n− t− 1) · 1/2
n− t
The constraint becomes ptc,b ≥ pta,b.
Instance I, At−1 contains a, and b: For t = 2 this case does not occur. For t ≥ 3, both players are aware
that there are only c-candidates left. R follows any signaling strategy that guarantees a HIRE signal
in the remaining rounds.
Instance II, At−1 contains only c: E[ρθt | σt = HIRE] ≥ E[ρθt+1 | σt = HIRE] implies
pta,c · 0 + (n− t) · ptc,c · 1/2 ≥ pta,c · 1/2 + (n− t) · ptc,c ·
(n− t− 1) · 1/2
n− t
The constraint becomes ptc,c ≥ pta,c.
Instance II, At−1 contains a: In this case R knows that there are only c-candidates left. R follows any
signaling strategy that guarantees a HIRE signal in the remaining rounds.
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The proof of the theorem now follows by analyzing the approximation ratio when applying such a mech-
anism in instance I.
Proof of Theorem 2.15. Consider instance I. Instance I in the benchmark scenario yields an optimal success
probability of 1/2 (recommend a or b each with probability 1/2). Let us analyze the performance of a
mechanism on instance I that satisfies Lemma 2.16. Such a mechanism is much more careful to recommend
a. If candidate b would not exist, there would be a lack of interest of R (that knows instance II is present)
to accept a recommendation of a. This risk arising from the potential presence of instance II is captured by
the constraints in Lemma 2.16.
Formally, if the mechanism reaches round n without a previous HIRE signal, then, obviously, it is optimal
to signal HIRE in round n with probability 1. We will prove by induction that there is an optimal mechanism
φ with the following property. If φ reaches any round t without a previous HIRE signal, it is optimal to hire
in round t with probability 1. Thus, there is an optimal mechanism that hires in round 1 with probability
1. Obviously, this mechanism has success probability 1/n.
Suppose the inductive assumption is true for rounds t + 1, . . . , n, i.e., if the mechanism reaches round
t+ 1 without a previous HIRE signal, it is optimal to hire any candidate in that round with probability 1.
Now consider round t ≥ 2.
At−1 contains only c: If a arrives in round t, then the success probability is pta,c. If b arrives, the success
probability is (1 − ptb,c) · 1n−t , since by assumption the mechanism hires every candidate in the next
round, which due to random arrival is a with uniform probability. If c arrives, the success probability
is (1− ptc,c) · 1n−t by similar arguments. Overall, we want to maximize
pta,c +
1− ptb,c
n− t + (n− t− 1) ·
1− ptc,c
n− t .
Due to Lemma 2.16 ptb,c ≥ pta,c and ptc,c ≥ pta,c. Hence, the expression is maximized if both constraints
hold with equality, in which case it becomes
pta,c +
1− pta,c
n− t + (n− t− 1) ·
1− pta,c
n− t = 1 ,
i.e., independent of the value of pta,c. Thus, p
t
a,c = p
t
b,c = p
t
c,c = 1 is an optimal choice.
At−1 contains a: If a has arrived and been rejected, the success probability is 0. Setting pb,a = pc,a = 1 is
an optimal choice.
At−1 contains b: If a arrives in round t, then the success probability is pta,b. If c arrives, the success
probability is (1 − ptc,b) · 1n−t , since by assumption the mechanism hires every candidate in the next
round, which due to random arrival is a with uniform probability. Overall, we want to maximize
pta,b + (n− t) ·
1− ptc,b
n− t .
Due to Lemma 2.16 ptc,b ≥ pta,b. Hence, the expression is maximized when the constraints holds with
equality, in which case it becomes
pta,b + (n− t) ·
1− pta,b
n− t = 1 .
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Thus, pta,b = p
t
c,b = 1 is an optimal choice.
At−1 contains a, and b: If a has arrived and been rejected, the success probability is 0. We already
observed above that in this case we can directly hire in round t with probability 1.
For round t = 1 we make a final similar observation. The success probability is p1a if a arrives, (1−p1b)· 1n−1
if b arrives and (1− p1c) · 1n−1 if c arrives. Overall, we want to maximize
p1a +
1− p1b
n− 1 + (n− 2) ·
1− p1c
n− 1
Due to Lemma 2.16 p1b ≥ p1a and p1c ≥ p1a. Hence, the expression is maximized when both constraints hold
with equality, in which case it becomes
p1a + (n− 1) ·
1− p1a
n− 1 = 1 .
Thus, p1a = p
1
b = p
1
c = 1 is an optimal choice.
This proves the theorem.
The proof can be applied literally by simply replacing “success probability” with “expected utility” for S,
since in both instances I and II the best candidate a is the only one that yields positive utility for S. This
implies the following corollary.
Corollary 2.17. There is no persuasive mechanism that guarantees S an expected utility of more than
2
n ·OPT, where OPT is the optimal expected utility in the corresponding benchmark instance.
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A Ordinal Utility for R
Let us now consider the problem when R is only interested in hiring her (unique) best candidate, i.e., the
case of ordinal receiver utility.
A.1 Basic Scenario without Disclosure
In this scenario, the set of valuation pairs is known a-priori to both parties. While S observes the candidates,
R only observes the signals sent by S. R is indifferent about all candidates which are not her best. As such,
for a persuasive mechanism for S, we can restrict to signal HIRE for exactly one of the two optimal candidates
cR and cS .
In the Elementary mechanism, we decide upfront whether to signal HIRE for either cR or cS : Draw
x ∼ Unif [0, 1]. If x ≤ 1/n, signal HIRE upon arrival of cR, otherwise, signal HIRE upon arrival of cS .
Signal NOT for any other candidate.
Proposition A.1. The Elementary mechanism is persuasive in the basic scenario without disclosure. It
yields a success probability of (1− o(1)) and an expected utility of (1 − o(1)) · ξmax for S.
Proof. First, we prove persuasiveness.
In round t with σt = HIRE we have Pr[θt = cR] =
1/n
1/n+(n−1)/n = 1/n. Suppose R deviates to hire in
a later round r > t. Since S will not signal HIRE again, R must choose r without additional information.
Then Pr[θr = cR] = (1− 1/n) · 1/(n− 1) = 1/n. Thus, it is optimal for R to hire θt.
If σt′ = NOT for all t
′ ∈ [t], then Pr[θt = cR] =
n−1
n
n−2+ 1
n
+n−1
n
= 1n . Hence, it is optimal for cR to wait for
the round with signal HIRE.
Additionally, the Elementary mechanism clearly implies the sender-optimal candidate cS is hired with
probability 1− o(1) and yields an expected utility of (1− o(1))ξmax for S.
A.2 Secretary Scenario without Disclosure
In this case, we assume that R has the same information as in the basic scenario. Now the valuation pairs
are unknown to S. In this scenario, she can use the following mechanism that relies on the classic secretary
algorithm due to Dynkin [13].
The Simple Secretary mechanism decides once in the beginning whether to run the classic algorithm based
either on ξ-values or ρ-values. In the classic algorithm, we sample the first s = ⌊n/e⌋ candidates. Then we
signal HIRE for the first candidate that is the best one so far (in terms of either ξ- or ρ-values, depending on
the variant that is used). The classic algorithm hires the best candidate with probability 1/e− o(1). For our
mechanism, with probability 1− e/n, we run the classic algorithm using the ξ-values of S, with probability
e/n the ρ-values of R. Note that e/n = o(1), so as the number of candidates increases, the mechanism
tends to run the classic algorithm almost exclusively in the sender-optimal version. By assumption, if the
mechanism decided to signal σt = NOT in all rounds t = 1, . . . , n− 1, it sets σn = HIRE.
Theorem A.2. The Simple Secretary mechanism is persuasive in the secretary scenario without disclosure.
It yields a success probability of 1/e− o(1) and an expected utility of (1/e− o(1)) · ξmax for S.
Proof. We begin the proof by showing persuasiveness.
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Due to random order and the symmetric structure of the secretary algorithm, it produces the same
distribution of HIRE signals, both for the sender-optimal or the receiver-optimal version of the secretary
algorithm. In particular, for every round t > ⌊n/e⌋, and for any set At of arrived candidates in the rounds
1, . . . , t, the mechanism sends a hire signal in round t when the best candidate from At arrives in round t
and the second best arrived in the sample phase. Hence, Pr[σt = HIRE | At] = 1t · st−1 , which is the same
for every set At and for both the sender-optimal or receiver-optimal variant. There is no disclosure, so R
cannot distinguish which variant is used.
We first show persuasiveness for negatively correlated utilities, i.e., when the i-th best candidate for S is
the (n− i+ 1)-th best candidate for R.
Consider a round t ∈ [n− 1].
Case σt = HIRE: With probability e/n the receiver-optimal version is run and the candidate is the best
so far in terms of ρ. The probability that this candidate is actually cR is t/n. If the sender-optimal
version is run, there is no HIRE signal for cR. Hence, overall in this case Pr[θt = cR] = et/n2.
If R decides to deviate to a later round, she does not receive additional information from S. Due to
random order arrival and the independence of the HIRE signal of the set of arrived candidates, in any
given round r > t we have Pr[θr = cR] = n−tn · 1n−t = 1n . Since t ≥ s+ 1 > n/e we have et/n2 > 1/n.
Hence, following the HIRE signal is optimal.
Case t > s and σi = NOT for all i ≤ t: With probability e/n the receiver-optimal version is run and the
current candidate in round t is not the best so far in terms of ρ. Then it cannot be cR. With probability
1−e/n the sender-optimal version is run and the candidate in round t is not the best so far in terms of
ξ. Then, cR has probability t/n to be among the set At of the first t candidates. Given that cR ∈ At, it
arrives in round t with probability 1t−1 – there have been only NOT signals, so the best candidate from
At must be in the sample phase. Hence, overall in this case Pr[θt = cR] =
(
1− en
) · tn(t−1) = (n−e)tn2(t−1) .
If instead R follows the mechanism, then in round r > t the candidate is best so far with probability
1
r · sr−1 = sr(r−1) . Note that in this case, we condition on NOT signals in all rounds ≤ t. Hence,
candidate θr is best so far with probability
s/(r(r−1))
s/t . This candidate is cR with probability er/n
2 as
noted above.
Moreover, in the last round, there is always a HIRE signal. The probability that no candidate after
the sample phase is ever the best so far is sn . Since we condition on NOT signals in all rounds ≤ t, this
gives a probability of s/ns/t . This candidate can be cR only when we run the sender-optimal variant.
Hence, the probability that this candidate is cR is
(
1− en
) · 1n−1 . Hence, in this case, following the
mechanism R obtains cR with probability
n∑
r=t+1
s/(r(r − 1))
s/t
· er
n2
+
s/n
s/t
·
(
1− e
n
)
· 1
n− 1 =
t
n2
(
n− e
n− 1 +
n∑
r=t+1
e
r − 1
)
(6)
Thus, deviation by hiring in round t is unprofitable if
n− e
t− 1 ≤
n− e
n− 1 + e ·
n∑
r=t+1
1
r − 1
or, equivalently
1
t− 1 −
1
n− 1 ≤
e
n
(
1
t− 1 −
1
n− 1 +
n∑
r=t+1
1
r − 1
)
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and, thus,
n− t
(n− 1)(t− 1)
(∑n−2
r=t−1
1
r
) ≤ e
n
. (7)
Claim 2. The lower bound in equation (7) is monotonically decreasing in t. Hence, the strongest lower
bound arises in round t = s+ 1.
Proof. We want to prove that
n− t
(n− 1)(t− 1)
(∑n−2
r=t−1
1
r
) ≤ n− t+ 1
(n− 1)(t− 2)
(∑n−2
r=t−2
1
r
)
We drop the terms (n − 1), bring the summations up, and cluster the non-summation terms on the
right side. This yields
n−2∑
r=t−2
1
r
≤
(
1 +
n− 1
(n− t)(t− 2)
)
·
(
n−2∑
r=t−1
1
r
)
which implies
1
t− 2 ≤
n− 1
(n− t)(t− 2) ·
(
n−2∑
r=t−1
1
r
)
and, hence
n− t ≤ (n− 1)
(
n−2∑
r=t−1
1
r
)
.
This is true for t = n− 1. Suppose it is true for some value of t, then it is also true for t′ = t− 1 – the
left-hand side increases by 1, the right-hand side increases by n−1t−2 > 1. This proves the claim.
Using the claim, we can restrict attention to
e
n
≥ n− s− 1
(n− 1)s
(∑n−2
r=s
1
r
)
Recall that s = ⌊n/e⌋. For small n ≤ 8, the bound follows by direct inspection. For n ≥ 9, we use
the following inequality (cf [28]), where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant and Hn the n-th harmonic
number:
1
2(n+ 1)
< Hn − lnn− γ < 1
2n
and bound
n−2∑
t=⌊ne ⌋
1
t
= Hn−2 −H⌊ne ⌋−1 ≥
1
2(n− 1) + ln(n− 2)−
1
2(
⌊
n
e
⌋− 1) − ln
(⌊n
e
⌋
− 1
)
. (8)
Further, we have n ≥ 3 + 2e and thus 2n− 2− 2e ≥ n+ 1. Hence, the following holds:
1 ≥ n+ 1
2(n− (1 + e)) =
n2 + n
2n2 − 2(1 + e)n
≥ 2n
2(1e − 1e2 ) + n(e+ 2e − 3)
2n2 − 2(1 + e)n+ 2e =
2n(1− 1e )
2(n− 1)e −
1
2(n− 1) +
1
2(ne − 1)
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≥ n(1−
1
e )
(n− 1)e −
1
2(n− 1) +
1
2(⌊ne ⌋ − 1)
Combining this with (8) and the fact that n− 2 ≥ e (⌊ne ⌋− 1) and hence ln n−2⌊ne ⌋−1 ≥ 1, we get
ln
n− 2⌊
n
e
⌋− 1 + 12(n− 1) − 12 (⌊ne ⌋− 1) ≥
n
(
1− 1e
)
(n− 1)e
and therefore
e
n
≥ n−
⌊
n
e
⌋− 1
(n− 1) ⌊ne ⌋∑n−2t=⌊ne ⌋ 1t
as desired.
Case t ≤ s: Finally, suppose R deviates and hires a candidate during round t ∈ [s]. The probability of
hiring cR is 1/n, no matter which variant of the algorithm is running.
If we want to bound the probability to hire cR when following the mechanism, we can apply the bound
in equation (6). However, since t ≤ s, we always have NOT signals until round t. We remove the
conditioning on having NOT signals until round t, and the probability becomes
n∑
r=s+1
s
r(r − 1) ·
er
n2
+
s
n
· n− e
n(n− 1) =
s
n2
(
n− e
n− 1 +
n∑
r=s+1
e
r − 1
)
.
Thus, accepting the candidate in round t ≤ s is unprofitable if
n
s
≤ n− e
n− 1 +
n∑
r=s+1
e
r − 1 .
This implies
e
n
(
n−2∑
r=s
1
r
)
≥ 1
s
− 1
n− 1
and, thus,
e
n
≥ n− s− 1
(n− 1)s
(∑n−2
r=s
1
r
)
which we proved true in the previous case.
Hence, the mechanism is persuasive if utilities are negatively correlated.
If cR is not the worst candidate for S, the following changes to the probabilities occur.
Obviously, the probabilities of hiring cR when running the receiver-optimal algorithm are the same.
When running the sender-optimal algorithm, the probability of getting cR upon a signal HIRE increases.
Suppose the sender-rank of cR is x < n. This means that there are x − 1 candidates which S prefers over
cR. Thus, a signal HIRE for cR implies that all x − 1 candidates have to arrive after the current round. If
they arrive during the sample phase, cR will not get a HIRE signal, if they arrive between sample phase and
the current round, they would have gotten the signal HIRE instead of cR.
Thus, instead of 0, the probability of getting cR upon a HIRE signal in the sender-optimal variant is
t
n · n−tn−1 · n−t−1n−2 · · · · · n−t−(x−2)n−(x−1) ≥ 0.
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Further, a candidate that is not recommended for hire has an even smaller probability of being cR. The
exact probability amounts to tn · 1t−1 ·
(
1− n−tn−1 · n−t−1n−2 · · · · · n−t−(x−2)n−(x−1)
)
≤ tn(t−1) .
The probabilities of getting cR when hiring in a round during the sampling phase or in a round after the
HIRE signal remain 1/n by similar calculations as above.
Overall, the incentive to follow the algorithm weakly increases for decreasing rank x. The mechanism is
persuasive when eR is the worst candidate for S, and also of cR is at any rank 1 ≤ x < n in the preference
of S.
Together with the fact that the mechanism clearly hires the sender-optimal candidate cS with probability
1/e− o(1) and thus yields an expected utility of (1/e− o(1))ξmax for S, this proves the theorem.
A.3 Basic Scenario with Disclosure
In this section, we consider the basic scenario with disclosure, i.e., both S and R have the same a-priori
information as in the basic scenario. Now the rejected candidates are revealed to R. This additional
information obtained by disclosure does not significantly change the results for S.
In round t, the Adaptive Elementary mechanism signals as follows. If there has been no HIRE signal in
any earlier round and cS arrives in round t, it signals HIRE. If there has been no HIRE signal in any earlier
round and cR arrives in round t, it signals HIRE with probability 1/(n − t). It signals NOT in any other
case.
Lemma A.3. The Adaptive Elementary mechanism is persuasive in the basic scenario with disclosure.
Proof. If cR has already arrived and was rejected, R will not get her best candidate. Recall that the rejected
candidates are revealed. Since R is indifferent among the remaining candidates, it is optimal to follow the
remaining signals of S. Hence, for the remainder of the persuasiveness argument, we assume that cR has
not been rejected.
If the signal in round t is HIRE, the current candidate is cR with probability 1n−t
/(
1 + 1n−t
)
= 1n−t+1 .
If R decides to deviate and hire in some later round r, she will not get any additional information. Thus,
due to random-order arrival, the probability of hiring cR in round r is
(
1− 1n−t+1
)
· 1n−t = 1n−t+1 . Hence,
it is optimal to follow the signal.
Now suppose up to and including round t there have been only NOT signals. If R deviates and hires the
current candidate in round t, she hires cR with probability n−t−1n−t
/(
n− t− 1 + n−t−1n−t
)
= 1n−t
/(
1 + 1n−t
)
=
1
n−t+1 . If instead R follows the mechanism, then suppose the HIRE signal comes in round r > t. We showed
above that this gives a success probability of 1n−r+1 – if cR was not rejected in one of the rounds i = t, . . . , r−1.
By the previous paragraph, in round i with signal σi = NOT, candidate cR is getting rejected with probability
1
n−i+1 . Thus, if R follows the mechanism, the success probability is
∏r−1
i=t
(
1− 1n−i+1
)
· 1n−r+1 = 1n−t+1 .
Hence, it is optimal for R to follow the mechanism.
Proposition A.4. In the basic scenario with disclosure, the Adaptive Elementary mechanism yields a success
probability of 1− o(1) and an expected utility of (1 − o(1)) · ξmax for S.
Proof. Conditional on the fact that the sender-optimal candidate cS has not shown up in rounds 1, . . . , t− 1,
cS arrives in round t with probability 1/(n − t + 1). A similar probability holds for the receiver-optimal
candidate cR (i.e., conditional on cR not having arrived in an earlier round, the current candidate being cR).
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Algorithm 4: First-Opt Mechanism
Input: Number of candidates n, sample size s > 1
1 A0 ← ∅
2 for t = 1 to n− 1 do
3 At ← At−1 ∪ {θt}
4 if t ≤ s then Signal NOT // only NOT in the sample phase
5 else if (θt = argmaxi∈At ξi) or (θt = argmaxi∈At ρi) then
6 Signal HIRE and end mechanism
7 else Signal NOT
8 Signal HIRE on n-th candidate. // by definition
We first bound the success probability if R follows the mechanism. Let Aj be the probability of hiring
cS if j ≥ 2 candidates remain and cS and cR are both among those remaining candidates. The base case is
A2 = 1/2 as whichever candidate shows up first will be recommended with probability 1. We can express
Aj by the following recursion:
Aj =
1
j
· 1︸︷︷︸
cS arrives
+
1
j
· j − 2
j − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
cR arrives
+
j − 2
j
·Aj−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
neither
Solving the recursion gives us
An =
1
n
+
1
n
· n− 2
n− 1 +
n− 2
n
· An−1 = 2n− 3
n(n− 1) +
2n− 5
n(n− 1) +
n− 2
n
· n− 3
n− 1 · An−2
=
2n− 3
n(n− 1) +
2n− 5
n(n− 1) +
2n− 7
n(n− 1) +
(n− 4)(n− 3)
n(n− 1) · An−3
=
n−2∑
i=1
2(n− i)− 1
n(n− 1) +
2
n(n− 1) ·
1
2
= 1− 1
n
.
This proves the approximation guarantee.
A.4 Secretary Scenario with Disclosure
In the secretary scenario with disclosure, R sees in each round t a signal σt. When R decides to reject the
candidate in round t, she gets to see its identity θt. Recall that we assume R knows the set of candidates
upfront, while S only learns the values of a candidate when it arrives. We consider the First-Opt mechanism
(see Algorithm 4). It rejects the first s candidates. We will choose s = ⌊n/2⌋. Subsequently, it recommends
for hire the first candidate that is best among the arrived candidates, either for S or for R. In the last round,
S always signals HIRE.
Lemma A.5. The First-Opt mechanism is persuasive in the secretary scenario with disclosure.
Proof. If cR has already arrived and was rejected (and, thus, revealed), R is indifferent among the remaining
candidates. As such, it is optimal to follow the remaining signals of S. For the remainder of the proof of
persuasiveness, we assume cR has not been rejected.
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Suppose σt = HIRE in round t ≤ n− 1, then Pr[θt = cR | σt = HIRE] ≥ 1n−t+1 . If R decides to deviate
and hire in some later round r > t, she will not get any additional information from S. Due to random-order
arrival, the success probability is Pr[θr = cR | σt = HIRE] ≤
(
1− 1n−t+1
)
· 1n−t = 1n−t+1 . Hence, it is
optimal to follow the signal.
Now suppose σt′ = NOT for all t
′ ∈ [t]. If t ≥ s+1 after the sample phase, the candidate is not the best one
among the arrived ones, so θt 6= cR. It is optimal for R to wait for a round with a HIRE signal. Otherwise, if
t ≤ s during the sample phase, then Pr[θt = cR] = 1n−t+1 (note that we assume cR has not been rejected). In
contrast, if R follows the mechanism, then Pr[θt, θt+1, . . . , θs 6= cR] =
∏s
t′=t
(
1− 1n−t′+1
)
= n−sn−t+1 . Then,
the sample phase ends and, due to disclosure, R can determine all remaining candidates that are better (in
terms of ξ, ρ, or both) than all arrived (and revealed) candidates during the sample phase. All remaining
n − s candidates might fulfill this condition, with cR being one of them. If R follows the mechanism, she
will end up hiring a random one of these candidates. Hence, the success probability when following the
mechanism is at least n−sn−t+1 · 1n−s = 1n−t+1 . Hence, it is optimal for R to follow the mechanism.
Theorem A.6. In the secretary scenario with disclosure, the First-Opt mechanism with s = ⌊n/2⌋ yields a
success probability of at least 1/4− o(1) and an expected utility of at least (1/4− o(1)) · ξmax for S.
Proof. Let At denote the random set of candidates observed up to round t. The first s candidates get a NOT
signal. For each round t ≥ s+ 1, we can determine the candidate in round t by first drawing randomly the
set At, and then drawing a uniform random candidate from At to arrive in round t. In At there are (one or)
two candidates that can potentially generate a HIRE signal in round t, the best one for S and the one best
for R (could be the same one). Hence, the probability of signal HIRE is at most 2t . Overall, the probability
P[σt = NOT | At] is at least
P[σt = NOT | At] ≥

1 t = 1, . . . , st−2
t t = s+ 1, . . . , n− 1
. (9)
The success probability for S in round t > s conditioned on At is
Pr[θt = cS | At] = Pr[cS ∈ At] · Pr[θt = cS | cS ∈ At] · P[σ1, . . . , σt−1 = NOT | At−1]
=
t
n
· 1
t
·
t−1∏
k=s+1
P[σk = NOT | Ak] ≥ 1
n
t−1∏
k=s+1
k − 2
k
=
1
n
(s− 1)s
(t− 2)(t− 1) ,
and, since these probabilities are independent of At, the overall success probability for S is at least
n∑
t=s+1
1
n
· (s− 1)s
(t− 2)(t− 1) =
(s− 1)s
n
n∑
t=s+1
(
1
t− 2 −
1
t− 1
)
=
s
n
(
1− s− 1
n− 1
)
.
The expression is optimized for s = ⌊n/2⌋ and yields a success probability of 14 − o(1). The mechanism is
entirely symmetric in terms of sender and receiver, so the same result applies to the success probability of
R.
We now show that the First-Opt mechanism is indeed optimal, in the sense that there are cases in which
no mechanism can achieve a better success probability. We study negatively correlated utilities, i.e., the
35
candidate with rank i for S has rank n − i + 1 for R for all i ∈ [n]. Observe that, beyond defining the
ranking, cardinal utility values are irrelevant for the objectives of S and R. Moreover, given the ranking of
known candidates, S can infer no additional information from their values about the position of the current
candidates in the overall ranking. As such, we will assume that S ignores the cardinal values.
Theorem A.7. If utilities of sender and receiver are negatively correlated, the First-Opt mechanism maxi-
mizes the success probability for S among all persuasive mechanisms in the secretary scenario with disclosure.
We first show the structural Lemmas A.8-A.10. We concentrate on the following class of randomized
Best-So-Far mechanisms. A Best-So-Far mechanism signals HIRE in rounds 1, . . . , n− 1 with probability >
0 only if the candidate in the current round is best so far for either S or R. A Best-So-Far mechanism always
signals HIRE in the last round if it has not done so before. We show that we can turn any mechanism into
a Best-So-Far mechanism. This yields higher success probabilities for S and does not hurt the incentives for
R, since hiring non-best-so-far candidates is unprofitable for both S and R.
Lemma A.8. If utilities of sender and receiver are negatively correlated, then for every persuasive mechanism
there is a persuasive Best-So-Far mechanism with weakly higher success probability for S.
Proof. Consider a persuasive mechanism φ for S. We construct a new Best-So-Far mechanism φ′ as follows.
The new mechanism runs φ. Whenever φ decides to signal HIRE on a candidate that is neither best so far
for S nor R, φ′ changes the signaling strategy. We assume for the moment that in this case φ′ sends to R a
separate transition signal. φ′ then signals NOT in all rounds t, . . . , n− 1 and HIRE in round n.
Clearly, for any HIRE signal received in rounds 1, . . . , n − 1, φ′ yields a higher conditional probability
that the recommended candidate is cR. If the transition signal is received, the mechanism switches to a
deterministic HIRE signal in the last round. This only increases both, the probability to hire the sender-
and receiver-optimal candidates cS and cR, since in this case φ would have hired a suboptimal candidate for
both S and R.
If φ comes to round n−1 without a HIRE signal, φ′ signals HIRE in round n. This, too, weakly increases
both the probabilities of hiring cS and of hiring cR.
Hence, given that φ is persuasive, φ′ is persuasive as well. It increases the success probability for both
S and R. Finally, φ′ remains persuasive even when we omit the transition signal, since R is given only less
information.
For the rest of the argument, we concentrate on Best-So-Far mechanisms. Note that Best-So-Far mech-
anisms are not always persuasive. For example, simply flipping a coin and running the sender-optimal or
the receiver-optimal secretary algorithm throughout is a Best-So-Far mechanism. In the secretary scenario
without revelation this was our persuasive approach, but here it might give R incentives to deviate: By the
first time R sees that a currently best candidate for her was rejected, R knows the sender-optimal algo-
rithm is running. Then she might have an incentive to deviate, since the sender-optimal algorithm never
recommends cR.
We now enlarge the class of mechanisms under consideration. Suppose we are given any history At−1 of
arrived candidates until round t− 1. In round t, let pSt be the probability of signaling σt = HIRE if θt is the
best candidate so far for S. We define pRt accordingly.
Lemma A.9. If a Best-So-Far mechanism is persuasive for negatively correlated utilities, it satisfies pRt ≥ pSt
for all rounds t ∈ [n] and all histories At−1.
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Proof. Consider the beginning of round t ≤ n − 1, where n − t + 1 candidates are still to arrive. Since R
knows all candidates upfront and sees all rejected ones, she can determine which candidates would qualify
in round t as best so far for S or R. Suppose cR has not arrived yet. We construct a worst-case scenario
for R as follows: The second-best candidate for R has arrived, so cR is the only one that generates a HIRE
signal in favor of R. All other n− t candidates are the top n− t candidates for S.
In this worst-case scenario, if the probability pSt > p
R
t , then a HIRE signal in round t leads to hiring of
cR with probability of pRt
/
(pRt + (n − t)pSt ) < 1/(n − t + 1). In contrast, if a NOT signal is sent and R
deviates, she gets cR with probability of (1 − pRt )
/
(1 − pRt + (n − t)(1 − pSt )) > 1/(n− t + 1). Hence, the
mechanism is clearly not persuasive.
S (unlike R) is entirely unaware of whether the situation in the current round represents a worst-case
scenario or not. In fact, in every round, every history of arrived candidates could give rise to such a worst-
case scenario. As such, in order to guarantee persuasiveness, the mechanism needs to satisfy pRt ≥ pSt for all
rounds t ∈ [n− 1] and all histories of arrived candidates.
Consider the class of Best-So-Far mechanisms with pRt ≥ pSt . It could potentially extend slightly beyond
persuasive ones. We now optimize the success probability for S within this class. By the previous two
lemmas, this gives an upper bound on the success probability of any persuasive mechanism. For larger
values of pRt , we obviously have smaller success probability for S. Thus, the best mechanism in the class
satisfies pt = p
R
t = p
S
t in each round and for each history. Moreover, we can show that pt ∈ {0, 1}.
Lemma A.10. There is an optimal persuasive Best-So-Far mechanism for negatively correlated utilities
such that pt ∈ {0, 1} for all t ∈ [n− 1].
Proof. The proof is a simple backwards induction. Given round n, we assume by definition that a Best-So-
Far mechanism has pn = 1. Consider round n − 1 and condition on the event that the current candidate
is best so far for either S or R.2 Now there are two options, hire in this round or hire in round n. S can
determine probabilities of hiring the sender-optimal candidate cS for both these options. It is then optimal
for S to decide deterministically for the option (i.e., either pn−1 = 1 or pn−1 = 0), whichever gives higher
success probability.
Thus, starting in round n− 1, the optimal policy uses pn, pn−1 ∈ {0, 1}. In round t < n − 1, we have a
similar situation. If the candidate is best so far, there are two options - either hire in this round or reject
and invoke the optimal policy for rounds t + 1, t + 2, . . . , n. S can determine probabilities of hiring cS for
both these options. It is then optimal for S to decide deterministically for the option (i.e., either pt = 1 or
pt = 0), whichever gives higher success probability.
Hence, by induction, the optimal Best-So-Far mechanism with pt = p
R
t = p
S
t has all pt ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof of Theorem A.7. Based on Lemma A.10, our goal is to determine optimal values pt ∈ {0, 1}. Our
proof generalizes ideas for the standard secretary problem [7]. Let Bt be the event that the candidate in
round t is best so far for either S or R. Let Rt be the event that candidate θt is rejected. Let R−t be the
event that all candidates θ1, . . . , θt−1 were rejected. Let ut = Pr[cS hired in rounds t, . . . , n | Bt, R−t] and
vt = Pr[cS hired in rounds t+ 1, . . . , n | Rt, R−t].
To reach round t + 1, we must have R−t and either Rt, or Bt and pt = 0. In both cases, consider the
conditional probability of Bt+1 i.e., Pr[Bt+1 | Rt, R−t] and Pr[Bt+1 | Bt, R−t].
2Note that since pn−1 = pSn−1 = p
R
n−1, we may not distinguish between the cases best so far for S or R.
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Note that due to random order arrival, conditioned on every set At of candidates arrived in rounds k =
1, . . . , t, we have the same probabilities of generating Bk and Rk events and, thus, the same probability of Bt,
R−t and Rt. Now, conditioned on At+1, the probability to have Bt+1 in round t+1 is Pr[Bt+1 | At+1] = 2t+1 ,
which is the same for every At+1. Since Pr[R−t | At] and Pr[Rt | At] are independent of the set At, we also
have Pr[Bt+1 | At+1, Rt, R−t] = Pr[Bt+1 | Rt, R−t] = 2t+1 . Moreover, since Pr[Bt | At] is the same for every
At, we have Pr[Bt+1 | At+1, Bt, R−t] = Pr[Bt+1 | Bt, R−t] = 2t+1 . Thus, we see that
vt =
2
t+ 1
· ut+1 + t− 1
t+ 1
· vt+1 . (10)
Now suppose θt is best so far, i.e., condition on Bt. If we hire θt, we get the sender-optimal cS with probability
t
2n . Otherwise, if we reject it, we get cS with probability vt. Thus, an optimal Best-So-Far mechanism will
choose the better alternative and obtain
ut = max
{
t
2n
, vt
}
. (11)
We resolve the recurrences for ut and vt by backwards induction. The base cases are vn = 0 and un =
1
2 .
Note that vn−1 = n−2n · vn + 2n · un = 1n , which yields un−1 = max
{
n−1
2n , vn−1
}
= n−12n . Repeating this
argument, we have ut > vt as long as
t
2n > vt, and thus should set pt = 1. If on the other hand vt ≥ t2n , it
is optimal to wait and set pt = 0, even though the current candidate is best so far. More generally, ut and
vt can be given as follows which we prove below.
Lemma A.11. ut and vt are given by
ut =


t
2n t ≥ n+12
n
4(n−1) t <
n+1
2 , n even,
n+1
4n t <
n+1
2 , n odd,
vt =


t(n−t)
n(n−1) t ≥ n+12
n
4(n−1) t <
n+1
2 , n even,
n+1
4n t <
n+1
2 , n odd.
Hence, it is optimal to signal NOT in the first s = ⌊n/2⌋ rounds and then signal HIRE for the first
candidate that is best so far, for either R or S. This is the First-Opt mechanism, and Theorem A.7 is
proved.
Proof of Lemma A.11. First, consider the case t ≥ n+12 and start with t = n. Due to the base cases,
vn = 0 =
n(n−n)
n(n−1) and un =
1
2 = max
{
n
2n , 0
}
.
Assume the lemma holds for t + 1 ≥ n+12 + 1. We show that it holds for t as well. First, observe that
t
2n ≥ t(n−t)n(n−1) for t ≥ n+12 and thus ut = t2n . For vt we get the following:
vt =
t− 1
t+ 1
· vt+1 + 2
t+ 1
· ut+1
=
t− 1
t+ 1
· 1
n
· (t+ 1)(n− (t+ 1))
n− 1 +
2
t+ 1
t+ 1
2n
=
1
n
· (t− 1)(n− t− 1) + (n− 1)
n− 1
=
1
n
· t(n− t)
n− 1
Now consider the second case in which t < n+12 . The base case is t =
n
2 or t =
n−1
2 , depending on the parity
of n.
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Case n even: It holds
vn
2
=
n/2− 1
n/2 + 1
· vn
2 +1
+
2
n/2 + 1
· un
2 +1
=
n− 2
n+ 2
· 1
n
· (n+ 2)(n− 2)
4(n− 1) +
2
n/2 + 1
· n/2 + 1
2n
=
1
n
· (n− 2)
2 + 4(n− 1)
4(n− 1)
=
1
4n(n− 1)
(
n2 − 4n+ 4 + 4n− 4)
=
n
4(n− 1)
Since t = n2 <
n+1
2 and thus
n
2
2n =
1
4 <
n
4(n−1) = vt, we now have ut = vt. This obviously leads to
vt = vt+1 and thus ut = vt for all t <
n+1
2 .
Case n odd: The case is similar:
vn−1
2
=
(n− 1)/2− 1
(n+ 1)/2
· vn+1
2
+
2
(n+ 1)/2
· un+1
2
=
n− 3
n+ 1
· 1
n
· (n+ 1)/2((n− 1)/2)
n− 1 +
2
(n+ 1)/2
· (n+ 1)/2
2n
=
1
n
· 1
4(n− 1) ((n− 3)(n− 1) + 4(n− 1))
=
1
n
· 1
4(n− 1)
(
n2 − 4n+ 3 + 4n− 4)
=
1
n
· 1
4(n− 1)(n+ 1)(n− 1)
=
n+ 1
4n
Again, t = n−12 <
n+1
2 and thus
n−1
2
2n =
1
4 − 14n < n+14n = vt. Hence, ut = vt for all t < n+12 .
This proves the lemma.
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